AFTER Marshal Soult had been obliged to leave Oporto and Portugal, the English army again passed the Douro, and returned to the towns of Thomar and Abrantes, near the Tagus, intending to march against Spanish Estremadura, by way of Coria and Placencia. The corps of Marshal Victor, occupying the country around Truxillo arid Caceres, being apprehensive that the English would get behind them by the right bank of the Tagus, crossed that river in the beginning of June, and retired to Calzada, and afterwards on the 26th, to Talavera de la Reyna.
On the 20th of July, the English army,. commanded by General Sir A. Wellesley, formed a junction at Oropeza with the Spanish army of General Cuesta. The number of the English was about 20,000, with from 4000 to 5000 Portuguese. General Cuestas army amounted to 38,000. Another Spanish army, under the command of General Venegas, of 18,000 or 20,000 men, waited to co-operate with General Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, in La Mancha.
A party of Portuguese and Spaniards of the advance, commanded by the English General Wilson, passed on to Escalona by the Arenas mountains, arriving on the 23d, so as to open a communication with the Spanish army of General Venegas, which was advancing from Tembleque by Ocana, to Aranjuez and Valdemoro. Generals Wilson and Venegas were to march upon Madrid, and endeavour to get possession of it through the aid of the inhabitants. This combined movement was intended to oblige King Joseph to concern himself solely with the safety of his capital, and to prevent him from concentrating his scattered forces. The Anglo- Spanish armies hoped soon to overcome the French, or at least to expel them from Madrid and the centre of Spain, and force them to cross the mountains and retire to Segovia.
The armies of Generals Wellesley and Cuesta, advanced on the 22d of July to Talavera. Not far from that city, the cavalry of General Cuesta gained a slight advantage over the rear-guard of the French cavalry, which withdrew to the main body. This success inspired the Spaniards with the most confident hopes, longing to avenge their defeat at Medellin by attacking the French themselves, whom they believed to be half-defeated be-- cause they had retired. They left the English at Talavera, and unwisely advanced by El Bravo and Santa Olalla, towards Torrijos.
Marshal Victor retired behind the Guadarama, near to Toledo, and on the 25th was joined by the corps of General Sebastian, and the troops brought from Madrid by King Joseph. The whole central French army thus united amounted to 47,000 men, and on the 26th it marched for Talavera, under the command of King Joseph.
The 2d regiment of hussars, which formed part of the French advanced guard, almost annihilated Villa Viciosas regiment of dragoons, in the defile of Alcabon, near to Torrijos, and the whole army of Cuesta retired precipitately behind the Alberche. The French crossed the river in the afternoon of the following day, drove in the English picquets, and arrived by five oclock within cannon-shot of the enemy.
The Spaniards were posted in a situation deemed impregnable, behind old walls and garden-- fences, which border and encompass the city of Talavera. Their right was defended by the Tagus, and their left joined the English, near a redoubt constructed on an eminence. The ground in front of the Anglo- Spanish armies was very unequal, and intersected here and there by ravines, formed by the rains of winter. The whole extent of their position was covered by the channel of a pretty deep torrent, at that time dry. The English left was strengthened by a conical eminence that commanded the greater part of the field of battle, and which was separated by a deep extensive valley from the Castilian chain of mountains.
This eminence was thus in a manner the key to the enemys position and against this decisive point of attack, an experienced general, possessed of that intuitive glance which insures success, would immediately have led the principal part of his disposable force, to obtain possession of it. He would either have taken it by assault, or have turned it by the valley. But King Joseph, when he should have acted, was seized with an unfortunate spirit of indecision and uncertainty. He attempted only half measures, he destributed his forces partially, and lost the opportunity of conquering while feeling the way for it. Marshal Jourdan, the second in command, had not that spur of patriotism in the Spanish war, which inspired him when he fought in the plains of Fleurus, to achieve the independence of France.
The French commenced the engagement by a cannonade and rifle- fire in advance of their right; and they despatched a single battalion only, and some sharpshooters, by the valley, to take the eminence which defended the English left, never thinking they would do otherwise than yield. This battalion, however, having to contend with superior numbers, was repulsed with loss, and compelled to return. A division of dragoons, which had gone to reconnoitre Talavera, found the approaches to that city strongly fortified with artillery, and could not advance.
At nightfall, the French made another attempt to gain the hill. A regiment of infantry, followed at a short distance by two others, attacked the extreme left of the English with unexampled ardour, arrived at the summit of the hill, and took possession of it. But having been fiercely assaulted, in its turn, by an entire division of the English, just, when having conquered, it was breathless with exertion, it was immediately obliged to give way. One of the two regiments commanded to assist in this attack, had lost its way, in a wood, on account of the darkness; the other not getting soon enough over the ravine, which covered the enemys position, had not arrived in time.
Both these attacks had miscarried, though conducted with intrepid bravery, because they had been made by an inadequate number of troops. A single battalion had been sent, and then one division, when a great proportion of the whole army should have been despatched. These unsuccessful attempts revealed to the English what we designed next day; and still more evidently demonstrated the importance of the station they held. They passed the greater part of the night in fortifying it with artillery.
The sun rose next morning on the two armies, drawn up in battle-order, and again the cannonade commenced. The defence of Portugal being intrusted to the English army, the fate of that country, and, perhaps, of all the Peninsula, was now to be decided by this contest. The veterans of the first and fourth French corps, accustomed for years to conquer throughout Europe, and always to witness their ardour seconded by the combined skill of their chiefs, burned with impatience for orders to engage, and thought to overthrow all before them by one well conjoined assault.
Only one division, consisting of three regiments of infantry, was sent by the valley to storm the position, which we had, for a moment, obtained possession of the preceding evening. After considerable loss, this division reached the top of the eminence, and was nearly successful. One of the regiments had advanced as far as the artillery, when our charge was repulsed, and the whole division was forced to retire The English, apprehending by this renewed attack, that the French designed to turn their left by the valley, stationed their cavalry there; and caused a division of the Spaniards to occupy the skirts of the high Castilian mountains beyond it. The French receded to the ground they first occupied. The cannonade continued for another hour, and then became gradually silent. The overpowering heat of mid-day obliged both armies to suspend the combat, and observe a kind of involuntary truce, during which the wounded were removed.
King Joseph, having at last gone himself to reconnoitre the enemys position, gave orders, at four oclock, for a general attack against the army of England. A division of dragoons was left to observe the Spaniards in the direction of Talavera. General Sebastians corps marched against the right of the English, whilst Marshal Victors three divisions of infantry, followed by masses of cavalry, charged against their left, to attack the eminence by the valley. King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan took post with the reserve, in the rear of the 4th division. The artillery and musketry were not long in being heard.
The English Commander, stationed on the hill which overlooked the field of battle, was present always wherever danger called. He could survey, at a glance, every corps of his army, and perceive below him the least movement of the French. He saw the line of battle formed, the columns disposed for the conflict; he penetrated their designs by their arrangements, and thus had time to order his plans, so as to anticipate and prevent those of his foes. The position of the English army was naturally strong and difficult of approach, both in front and flank; but in the rear it was quite accessible, and gave ample freedom to their troops to hasten to the quarter threatened.
The French had a ravine to pass before they could reach the enemy. They had to advance over ground much intersected, very rugged and unequal, obliging them frequently to break their line; and the positions they attacked had been previously fortified. The left could not see the right, or know what was passing there, for the rising ground between them. Every corps of the army fought apart, with unparalleled bravery, and ability too; but there waa no co-operation in their efforts. The French were not then commanded by a General-in-chief, the resources of whose genius might have compensated for the advantages which the nature of the ground denied them, and yielded to their enemies.
'The division of Lapisse first passed the ravine, attacked the fortified eminence, ascended it in defiance of a fire of grape-shot, which mowed down its ranks, but was repulsed with the loss of its General, and a great number of officers and soldiers. In retreating, it left the right of the fourth corps uncovered, which the British artillery took in flank, and forced for a moment to retire. The left of General Sebastianis corps, advanced under a most intense fire of artillery, to the foot of a redoubt on the right of the English, and between the combined armies. It was too far advanced, and too soon forward--it was encountered and driven back by the united corps of the English right and the Spanish left. Assistance came, and the combat was renewed. In the centre, Marshal Victor rallied the division of Lapisse at the foot of the hill, and abandoned all further attempt to gain possession of it. The French then tried to turn it either by the right or left. Vilattes division advanced in the valley, and Ruffins moved to the right of this by the foot of the Castilian mountains. The cavalry, forming a second line were in readiness to debouch into the plain in the rear of the enemy, wherever the infantry could open a passage.
Just as the French began to move, the English, with two regiments of cavalry, made a charge against their masses. They engaged in the valley, passed onwards regardless of the fire of several battalions of infantry, between the divisions of Vilatte and Ruffin, and fell with an impetuosity never surpassed on the 10th and 26th regiments of our chasseurs. The 10th could not resist the charge. They opened their ranks, but rallied immediately, and nearly the whole of the 23d regiment of light dragoons, the foremost of the English cavalry, was either destroyed or taken captive.
A division of the English Royal Guards, stationed on the left and centre of their army, being charged by the French, at first repulsed them vigorously; but one of its brigades being too far advanced, was in its turn taken in flank by the fire of the French artillery and infantry, sustained considerable loss, and retreated with some difficulty behind their second line. The French took advantage of this success; they again moved forward, and but one other effort was necessary to break through into the plain, and combat on equal ground. But King Joseph thought it was too late to advance with the reserve, and the attack was delayed till the following day. Night again closed over us, and the conflict ceased from exhaustion, without either side having won such a decided advantage as to entitle it to claim the victory.
The corps of Marshals Victor and Sebastiani withdrew successively during the night towards the reserve, leaving an advanced guard of cavalry on the scene of the engagement, to take care of the wounded. The English, who expected a new attack in the morning, were greatly surprised, when day dawned, to see that their enemies, leaving twenty pieces of cannon, had retreated to their old Position on the Alberche. The English and Spaniards, according to their own accounts, lost 6616 men. The French had nearly 10,000 slain.
King Joseph left the first corps darmée on the Alberche, and went with the fourth corps and the reserve to reinforce Toledo. That city, having a garrison of only 1500 men, had been warmly attacked by a division of the Spanish army of General Venegas, who had taken Aranjuez and Valdemoro on the 27th. Some days previously Madrid had nearly been seized by the vanguard corps of the English General Wilson, who had advanced from Escalona to Naval-Carnero. The inhabitants of the capital had opened their gates, and gone in crowds to meet him in their holiday dresses, after having obliged three French battalions, that formed the garrison, to shut themselves up in the fort of the Retiro. King Joseph lodged a complete division in Toledo, and came on the 1st of August to Illescas, that he might be equally able in that situation to march agaInst the army of Venegas, to assist the corps on the Alberche, and to overawe the inhabitants of Madrid.
The English retired on the 3d of August to Oropesa, without attempting any attack against Marshal Victor. They left the Spaniards at Talavera, and General Wilsons corps at Escalona. On the night of the 4th, the combined English and Spanish armies suddenly passed the Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo, on the approach of the corps of Marshal Soult, Ney, and Mortier, who were advancing from Salamanca by Puerto de Banos, Placencia, and Naval-Moral, placing themselves between the English and the bridge of Almarez.
The advanced corps of Marshal Mortier crossed the Tagus on the 8th of August, at a ford below the bridge of Arzobispo, during the time of siesta, an hour after mid-day. They surprised part of the army of Cuesta, and captured his cannon, as well as those planted to defend the bridge. On the 11th, General Sebastiani defeated the army of Venegas at Almonacid, in La Mancha. The Spanish and Portuguese corps under General Wilson were completely routed on the 12th of August, near the mountains of Banos, by part of the force under Marshal Ney, who was falling back on Salamanca.
The expedition of General Sir A. Wellesley in Estremadura, was at least as hazardous as that attempted by General Moore at the close of the preceding year, against the corps of Marshal Soult at Saldanna. The whole English and Spanish armies would have fallen into the power of the French, if the corps of Marshals Soult, Ney and Mortier, had arrived one day earlier in Estremadura. But King Joseph did not venture to dispose of these troops, without having previously received authority from the Emperor Napoleon. He had only sent the order to Marshal Soult on the 22d, to concentrate at Salamanca. This order was not received till the 27th. On the 28th he was on his march; but notwithstanding all his expedition, he only reached Placencia on the 3d of August.
The English and Spanish armies remained behind the Tagus till the 20th of August, occupying Messa de Ibor, Deleytosa, and Jeraicejo, opposite Almarez. The bridge of boats there had been broken down by the Spaniards. They then retired towards the Guadiana, and the army of Sir A. Wellesley re-entered Portugal.
The invasion of Estremadura by the English had caused the French to summon to the aid of the central army three corps, appointed to guard and observe the northern provinces of Spain; and their union gave them considerable strength. After the departure of the English, the Spanish government still persisted in the plan of fighting in great bodies. They assembled an army of 55,000 men in the plains of La Mancha, and that army was totally beaten and dispersed on the 10th of November at Ocana, by Marshal Mortiers single corps, hardly 24,000 strong. The French had no difficulty in defeating troops hastily raised and undisciplined, who had no skill to manoeuvre, and embarrassed themselves by their very numbers, which should have been their strength.
The French ought to have again brought together all their disposable forces after the battle of Ocana, and instantly marched against Lisbon. But they passed the Sierra-Morena, and invaded nearly all Andalusia, except the Isle of Leon and Cadiz, without meeting a single opponent. In thus extending to the south of Spain, they gave the English time to fortify Portugal, and to collect the military strength of that kingdom. The French were enfeebled, by being again separated, to occupy and organize a great extent of country. The Spaniards had everywhere an opportunity of again carrying on that species of national warfare from which the French had suffered so much in the Asturias, in Galicia, and in the north of Portugal.
In consequence of the destruction of the Spanish armies, the Provincial Juntas, being unable to hold any communication with the Central Junta, devoted all their energies to the local defence of the districts under their administration. Such of the inhabitants as had hitherto endured with patience, waiting in the hope that regular warfare would bring them deliverance, now trusted solely to their own exertions, for the means of shaking off their galling yoke. Every province, every town, every individual, felt the necessity more and more keenly every day, of repulsing the common enemy. The national hatred against the French, which existed almost universally, had inspired a kind of unity into the undirected efforts of the populace; and we now experienced, instead of regular warfare, a system of war in detail, a species of organized disorder, which exactly suited the unconquerable spirit of the Spanish nation, and their present wretched circumstances.
The districts of Spain occupied by the French were soon overrun by bands of partisans and guerillas, composed of the soldiers of dispersed armies, and the inhabitants of the plains and mountains. Clergymen, husbandmen, students, and simple shepherds, became active and enterprising chiefs. Leaders like these, without military authority, without regular troops, could prove at first only banners, so to speak, around whom the peasantry could by turns fight and rally. The report of any little success gained by these numerous parties, was greedily devoured by the people, and narrated with Southern exaggeration. It elevated their spirits, which defeat in other quarters might for a moment have depressed. That very restlessness of imagination, and that spirit of extra-independence, which had done injury to the slow and undecided operations of the regular armies of the Junta, now constituted the strength of the popular contest. It might thus be said of the Spaniards, that if they were at first an easy prey to the conqueror, to subdue them was an almost impossible task.
Whenever we moved from one province to another, the partisans of the enemy immediately commenced organizing the country in the name of Ferdinand VII., as if we had abandoned it entirely; and they then punished severely such of the inhabitants as had manifested any attachment to the French. Thus the terrors of our arms yielded us no advantage. As the enemy were spread throughout the whole country, the several points occupied by the French were all more or less threatened; our victorious troops, dispersed from Irun to Cadiz to retain their conquests, were in. a state of incessant blockade, and were, in fact, masters of the ground only on which they actually trode.
The garrisons, left to overawe the country, on the military roads, were continually attacked. They were obliged, for security, to construct small citadels, by repairing the old ruined castles on the heights. Sometimes these retreats were the remains of forts erected by the Romans or Moors, for the same purpose, many ages ago. In the plains, our posts of correspondence fortified one or two houses at the entry of the villages, to enjoy peace during the night, or for protection when danger menaced. The sentinels durst not station themselves beyond the bounds of the enclosures, lest they should have been assassinated. They therefore occupied some tower, or scaffolding of planks erected beside the chimney, in order to observe all that passed in their vicinity. The French soldiers, enclosed in their little fortresses, heard at times the mirthful sounds of the guitar-musicians of their enemies, who, being always well received and entertained by the people, came frequently to pass the night in the neighbouring villages.
The French armies could not receive any provisions or ammunition but under the escort of very strong detachments, which were always harassed, and often slain. These convoys were but feebly opposed in the plains, but they were obliged to cut their way by their valour whenever they entered the mountains. The daily losses sustained by the French in some parts of Spain, while procuring supplies, and securing their communications, were not less than they would have experienced if they had been constantly engaged with an enemy able to oppose them in the field.
The people of Spain did not give way to despondency, on account of the continuance of the war. In some provinces, the peasants were always armed. The husbandman held the plough with one hand, and a weapon in the other, always at command. This he buried in the ground, when the French approached in numbers too strong to promise victory. Their animosity increased with every new vexation to which they were exposed by the French. The evils patiently submitted to by other nations, because they are viewed as the inevitable consequences of war, were never failing subjects of irritation and hatred to the people of Spain. They employed by turns the greatest energy, or the most profound cunning, to satisfy their passionate resentments, when they felt they were the weaker party. Like vindictive vultures pursuing their prey, they followed after the French columns, to sacrifice such of the soldiers as fell behind on the march, from fatigue or from their wounds. Sometimes, also, the French soldiers, on their arrival in a place, were invited to feasts; when the Spaniards studied to intoxicate them, that they might be lulled into a security many thousand times more dangerous than the hazards of war. Then they called their partisans, and pointed out to them at night the houses where our soldiers were thoughtlessly dispersed. When other Frenchmen went to avenge the death of their comrades, the inhabitants were fled, and they found nothing but deserted dwellings, on which they could not wreak their vengeance without punishing themselves, in destroying the houses of such villages, they would have been deprived of resources for the time to come.
When our detachments came in some strength to the insurgent cities of Biscay or Navarre, the alcaids, the women and the children, came around us as if war had been unknown, and the noise of forge-hammers pealed through the air. But we had no sooner departed, than all the labour ceased, and the people flew to arms, to harass our detachments among the rocks, and attack our rear-guards. A war like this, on which the imagination of the soldier had no fixed object on which it could love to indulge, repressed his ardour, and tired him out of patience.
The French could only maintain possession of Spain by the terrors they inspired. They were always necessitated to punish the innocent with the guilty, and to avenge the offences of the powerful on the weak. Pillage had become indispensable for our support. The atrocities consequent on the hostility of the people, and the injustice of the cause for which the French contended, spread a moral contagion throughout their army, and sapped to the very core the foundations of military discipline, without which regular troops have neither power nor strength.
I returned to Spain about the end of the year 1809, bringing with me a detachment of eighty hussars to my regiment. In the interior of France, one would have believed from the Gazettes, that the English, having retreated to Portugal after the battle at Talavera, waited only for a fair wind to embark,--that the conquered country had a long while ago submitted to King Joseph,--and that the French armies, at rest in good cantonments, had no other task but to extirpate some bands of brigands who pillaged and committed excesses on the peaceable inhabitants.
We joined several other detachments of light cavalry at Bayonne, and crossed the Bidassoa to sleep in Irun. Many of the inhabitants of all ages had assembled at the gates of that city to see us arrive, and followed after us for some time with evident curiosity. We thought at first that their design in this mark of attention, was to evidence their satisfaction at our arrival itt their country. But we learned, when too late, that the people of Irun, as well as of other frontier towns, kept an exact account of all the French that entered Spain, and of all the wounded that left it; and it was according to this information that the Spanish partisans and guerillas directed their operations.
All the detachments going, like ourselves, to reinforce the different corps of the army in Spain, received orders to rendezvous in the cities of Vittoria and Miranda, to be sent on an expedition against the Spanish partisans of Navarre and La Rioca. General Simon left Vittoria on the 13th of December with 1200 men, and proceeded to occupy Salvatierra and Allegria. The commandants of the garrisons stationed in the cities of Navarre, had formed some flying columns, who were to join the corps of General Simon, after having dispersed such parties of the enemy as they might fall in with on their march. This kind of military chase was designed to destroy the bands of the partisan Mina, who kept Pampeluna in a state of almost constant blockade, attacking without interruption the convoys going to the French army of Arragon.
Generals Loison and Solignac commenced their march on the 16th from Vittoria and Miranda, and, by a simultaneous movement on both sides of the Ebro, they threw themselves on Logrono, hoping to surprise the Marquis de Porliere in that city. The numerous guerillas of that partisan chief intercepted our communications between Bayonne and Madrid, making daily incursions even to the gates of Burgos, Bribiesca, Pancorvo, Miranda, and Vittoria.
My detachment of hussars composed part of a corps of four or five thousand men, commanded by General Loison. The foot-soldiers had left their baggage behind them, and even their knapsacks, in order to be the more nimble for running among the mountains.
We came in sight of Logrono at four oclock in the afternoon of the 17th. General Solignacs troops presented themselves before that city about the same time. They immediately took possession of all the gates and outlets on the right side of the Ebro, while we seized on the bridge which leads to the left side of the river. We flattered ourselves, for an instant, that we had enclosed the partisans in Logrono; but, to our no small surprise, we entered that city soon after, without requiring to fire a single shot.
The Marquis de Porliere had been apprised in the morning of our combined march, and had escaped by the cross-roads to the high mountains of Castile. The inhabitants of the city, both men and women, stationed themselves at the windows to see us arrive. In general, their countenances displayed evident marks of contentment and satisfaction. They rejoiced that the Marquis of Porliere had avoided us, but truly not that they saw the French troops return. They knew full well, by past experience, that our coming would bring on them an exaction of the arrears of their contributions.
General Solignac went off next day in search of the enemy. At Najara, he fell in with a small party of Spaniards, whom he chased to La Clazada de Santo Domingo, thinking that he would reach the main body of the partisans. It was a stratagem of the Marquis de Porliere, intended to lead us in a direction the opposite of that which he and his small army had taken. General Loison followed General Solignac on the 19th to Najara. We were under the necessity of halting two whole days in that city, to acquire some information about the enemy, of whom we had completely lost all traces.
On the 21st, we were at last informed, that the Marquis de Porliere had taken the road for Soto. This town, situated among the mountains, was the residence of a provincial Junta; and the magazine of their arms, ammunition and clothing, was also in this place. We ascended the Najarillo to pursue the partisans once more. General Loisons division went to a village about ten leagues south of Soto, at the foot of elevated mountains, intending to spend there a few hours of the night. A detached corps, composed of my detachment of hussars, one hundred and fifty Polish lancers, and two hundred voltigeurs, continued to pursue the enemy. I cleared the march of this corps with an advanced guard of twenty-five hussars. We urged on through narrow wretched roads, in the midst of snow, till sunrise, when we came up with the rear-guard of the enemy, and made a few prisoners. We delayed several hours to feed our horses, and give General Loison time to arrive. At noon we resumed our march, on the left bank of a small river which flows towards Soto.
Some peasants were observed on the highest of the mountains towards our right, flying off with their cattle. Small platoons of Spanish cavalry, placed in watch on the heights, started off at the gallop as soon as they observed us. The clergy and alcaids of the hamlets we passed through, with counterfeited zeal, brought us refreshments on the way, evidently to hinder us from getting forward. From fifty to sixty peasants, of all ages, whom I questioned in different places, all endeavoured to deceive me, by saying that they had not seen the guerillas, and that they were nOt at Soto. But horses, expiring through fatigue, and abandoned on the road with their accoutrements, demonstrated at almost every step that we were not far distant from our foes.
As we came in sight of Soto, at about a quarter of a league off, we were suddenly received with a discharge of thirty or forty muskets; and some armed peasants were observed to fly from behind the rocks where they had been concealed, and to run down the mountains in full speed towards Soto. We halted, waiting for the infantry and the Major in command. No place could be found on the heights to form in battle-order, and we remained in file in the narrow path through which we had arrived.
Soto lies in the bottom of a narrow valley, which is divided by a torrent. On the other side of the town rises a very steep mountain, along the side of which a winding path has been formed. Up this road, we perceived the partisans urging their flight, exactly facing us. The magistrates of the Junta of Soto, and a great number of priests wrapped in black cloaks, marched foremost, and were near reaching the top of the mountain. The treasure and baggage followed next, borne by mules in files, the one tied behind the other. Then came the soldiers in uniforms, and a great many peasants armed with fowling-pieces, who marched without order. A crowd of all ages and sexes hurried tumultuously out of the town along with the partisans. The bustle of so many men, clambering up the mountains by different tracks, presented to the eye a truly picturesque appearance.
Confusion spread among the Spaniards on perceiving us, and at first they hastened their march by every path that was accessible. But, seeing that we were no more than a small advanced guard, they gathered courage, and the whole extent of the mountain resounded with their prolonged sonorous cries. Those who were nearest us stopped, and, stationing themselves on the rocks opposite, aimed at us with their muskets at their utmost stretch; and called out to us these words, ornamented with a thousand curses, "Come, look at the brigands a little nearer, if you dare!" It was thus our soldiers termed them, on account of their disorderly mode of fighting. They were separated from us by a ravine three or four hundred feet in depth, at the bottom of which the river flowed.
The Marquis de Porliere left behind him, to cover his retreat, a company of cavalry before the gate of Soto, by which we had to enter. At a little distance on the other side of the river, he had posted four or five hundred foot-soldiers, on the rocks and eminences which overlooked the town. Whatever happened, these men could easily retire without loss on our advance, but they could do us much harm.
The major of the 26th regiment, who commanded us, judging that the enemys position could not be carried in front, resolved to take it in flank. A hundred and fifty voltigeurs descended the ravine, crossed the river at a ford below us, climbed the mountain with no little trouble, and continued firing for some time at the enemy without gaining ground. Their ammunition failing them, they retired beside a small chapel on the top of the hill, and sent two men to tell us their condition. The firing, cursing, and shouting of the Spaniards, redoubled. They had observed our riflemen send for aid, and saw that we could not afford it.
The captain of the enemys cavalry advanced before his troop about half a gun-shot, near the entrance of the town, and began to provoke the officer who commanded the vanguard of our hussars, by his abusive language. This captain made his horse curvet, and fenced away with his sabre, to show that he could use it with dexterity. The hussar officer at first regarded him with perfect indifference; but, rendered impatient by his bravadoes and the shouts of the Spaniards present, whose audacity was increasing, he descended the narrow winding path which leads to Soto unaccompanied. The warlike captain turned his horses head when the officer was a few paces distant, and shrunk back quietly to the ranks of his cavalry.
Now, however, the uneasiness of the Major was every moment increasing. General Loison had not arrived, daylight was fading, we heard more firing at the summit of the hill opposite, and we had received no news about our voltigeurs.
When night arrived, we heard the Spanish drum beat a sort of retreat, and then we saw the flash of a pretty brisk fire of musketry at the bottom of the valley, between two parties who disputed the passage of the river. After the firing, a deep silence followed.
Solitude and night augmented our anxiety. We believed that our voltigeurs had come down the mountain opposite, through the midst of the enemy, and that, overpowered with numbers, they were in the last extremity. The Major in command sent my detachment forward to render some assistance if possible. On entering the city, we met, instead of Spaniards, the division of General Loison entering in files. Led astray by their guides, they had taken a road quite different from us, and very circuitous. The engagement, which had appeared so bloody to us at a distance, was in fact between our voltigeurs, who were descending to the town after the enemys departure, and the grenadiers of General Loisons advanced guard. These friends arriving at the same time from opposite directions, did not recognise each other till after the second discharge. Fortunately, the darkness of the night prevented them from taking aim, and there was but one man killed on either side.
Soto was abandoned by its inhabitants. The air now resounded with the rough voices of the soldiers, who ran through the streets and burst open the doors of the houses, to find victuals and lodging. In the midst of this confused uproar, which the echoes of the adjoining mountains endlessly redoubled, we heard the cry of a distracted female, who, with an unearthly voice, never ceased the whole night to cry for help. Having been left in the hospital of the town when the inhabitants fled, she had been struck with the unwonted bustle she noticed in the streets, through the bars of bet grated window. Her voice was raised amid the tumult, as if she had been the representative of the whole fugitive population. A fire was soon after seen among the heights, and we heard the crash of falling walls. Then an explosion took place, and we perceived the flaming wreck of a building blows into the air. The fire had reached some caissons of cartridges which the enemy, unable to carry with them, had concealed beneath a quantity of straw. At sunrise, we quitted Soto, and for two days followed the track of the partisans in the direction of Munilla and Cervera. Despairing at last of being able to get a blow at them, we took up our quarters in the town of Arnedo, and then returned to Logrono.
General Simon had no better success in his expedition into Navarre against Mina. That chief being attacked on the 19th at Estella, and on the 20th at Puente de la Reyna, disbanded his followers, and thus avoided the troops that were marching from every quarter against him. General Simon was no sooner gone, than Mina again collected his bands. The Marquis de Porliere, driven from the mountains of Castile, retraced his steps, and threw himself among those of Asturias. In this retreat, where he was pursued by a force at least four times stronger than his own, he did not lose more than thirty men.
By the accounts of the French commanders at this period, it appears that bands, similar to those of Porliere and Mina, existed in every province of Spain occupied by the French. These bands did incalculable mischief to our armies, and no power could extirpate them. Incessantly pursued, frequently dispersed, they always rallied again, and renewed their depredations.
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