ABOUT the middle of February, our corps d armée left La Mancha; and the troops under the command of General Sebastiani, the successor of Marshal Lefevre, came to the neighbourhood of Toledo, to watch the fragments of the army of the Duke de l Infantado. We proceeded to occupy the towns of Talavera, Arzobispo and Almarez, on the right bank of the Tagus, confronting the Spanish army of Estremadura. This army had been dispersed on the 24th December by Marshal Lefevre at Arzobispo opposite Almarez, but had since been reorganized and recruited under the command of General Cuesta. It had recovered the bridge of Almarez from the French; and blown up the principal arches, which completely arrested the march of our troops, and obliged us to erect a, new bridge over the Tagus, under the very fire of the enemy. We had indeed the possession of two other bridges, the one at Arzobispo, and the other at Talavera; but the route by these was at that time impracticable for artillery. Marshal Victor fixed his head-quarters at Almarez, that he might the better protect the works, and oversee the construction of the floats. Part of our division of light cavalry crossed the left bank of the river, to watch the enemy, and reconnoitre their right flank on the Ibor.
On account of the scarcity of forage and other necessaries, we were obliged to change our cantonments frequently. Almost the whole country occupied by our troops had been abandoned by its inhabitants. Before going, they used to build up, in a secret place of their dwellings, every thing of value which they could not remove. The first thing, therefore, our soldiers did in coming to their empty and unfurnished houses, was to measure like architects the outside wails, and then the inside rooms, to examine if a~y space had been taken off. Sometimes we also found vessels of wine concealed in the earth. We were thus taught to live on chance-offerings, passing whole weeks without a supply of bread, and without being able to procure barley for our horses.
On the 14th of March, our floats were at length finished; but we could neither launch them, nor construct a bridge, under the fire of the enemy. It was therefore found necessary to dislodge them from the strong position they held before Almarez, at the confluence of the Ibor and the Tagus. On the 15th of March, part of the first corps d armée crossed the Tagus at Talavera and Arzobispo, to bear upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards. General Laval s German division first attacked the enemy on the morning of the 17th, at the village of Messa de Ibor. With the bayonet alone, and without artillery, 3000 men of that division routed 8000 Spaniards, who were intrenched on a lofty eminence, and fortified with six pieces of cannon. The 18th was spent in driving the enemy from Valdecannar, and chasing them from one station to another, and from rock to rock, as far as the defile of Miravette. Our regiment formed part of the left wing of the army, along with Vilatte's division. We ascended the current of the Ibor, easily repulsing the Spaniards who retained not a single post whenever they saw it turned.
The 19th, being occupied with the launch of the floats, the army made no advance. The portable bridge being completed before night, the troops that remained on the right bank of the Tagus, and the artillery, began to pass over immediately. By the 20th, the whole army had united again at Truxillo. A little before our arrival, been an action before that city between the chasseurs à cheval of the 5th regiment, which formed our advanced guard, and the royal carabineers of the enemy's rear guard. The number killed on either side was nearly equal, but the Spaniards lost the commander of a squadron.
The night was passed by both armies in sight of each other; and an hour before sunrise next morning, the enemy were on their march. We followed them soon after. The 10th chasseurs formed the advanced guard of our division of light horse, which cleared the way itself for all the troops. Four companies of light infantry passed on before us, when we came to a district intersected with forests and hills. Two hours before sunset,. our vanguard squadron of chasseurs came up with the rear-guard of the enemy, which, being closely pressed, soon retired on the main body. The Colonel of the 10th, stimulated by a rash bravery, permitted the. whole regiment to make a charge, which soon became animated, and they pursued the Spanish cavalry for more than a league, on a causey between craggy hills, planted with holme.
When a regiment or squadron of cavalry charges, either in line or column, the exact order in which it commenced to gallop cannot long be preserved; for the horses excite each other, and their ardour increases, till he who is best mounted finds himself foremost, and the line of battle is broken. The leader of an advanced party ought always to be cautious never to charge but for a very short distance, and to rally his men often, that the horses may recover their wind, and there be time to guard against a surprise. Besides, in all cases where a troop is too far in advance to be instantly assisted by another corps, there ought to be a reserve of at least one half of the company to sustain the other, and afford a kind of intrenchment to those who are attacked, behind which they may again form, if they are repelled and pursued by a superior force.
Near the village of Miajadas, the Spaniards stationed an ambuscade of several squadrons of their best cavalry, which chosen band fell suddenly on our chasseurs of the advanced guard, who were riding scattered and disorderly, the one before the other. Our chasseurs were overpowered by numbers; their horses, exhausted with a most unmeasured charge, could not unite for their defence; and in less than ten minutes the enemy had disabled more than 150 of the bravest of the troop.
General Lasalle being apprised of what was passing, sent us instantly to their relief. We arrived too late, seeing only the distant trace of the Spaniards in the dust they raised in retiring. The colonel of the 10th was intent in again drawing up his men, who were tearing their hair with vexation, and assisting their wounded comrades to rise that were strewed all around. The night coming on, we returned to bivouack in the rear of the scene of action. At every step we encountered such of the wounded as had not yet received succour. Seeing us pass, they cried out, "Comrades à moi, ne m abandonnez pas"—"Comrades, do not abandon us." We assisted them to mount our own horses, but some of them again fell to the ground, and expired in the arms of their fellow-soldiers.
On the 22d of March the enemy crossed the Guadiana. We occupied separate quarters in the environs of Miajadas and San Pedro. Our artillery at length arriving on the 23d, the greater part of the army was concentrated in and around the city of Merida.
During the night of the 27th, the whole army was in motion to march against the enemy. For several days General Cuesta had waited for us in the plains before Medellin, having previously surveyed, with the help of engineers, the advantageous position where his army was stationed. The Spaniards, to whom pitched battles had proved so frequently unfavourable, sought by every method to gain that confidence which they so much needed. They regarded the skirmish at Miajadas as a presage of success. They relied also on some ancient superstition associated with the remembrance of the conquests their ancestors had obtained over the Moors, in the very plains which are watered by the Guadiana. The French disregarded their confidence, and trusted from habit in the certainty of victory.
After crossing the Guadiana, by a very long and narrow bridge, one enters the city of Medellin. Beyond it lies an extensive plain without plantations, which stretches up the Guadiana between that river, the city of Don Benito, and the village of Mingabril. The Spaniards at first occupied the heights between these towns; and afterwards extending their line farther, they formed a sort of crescent, with the left at Mingabril, their centre before Don Benito, and the right wing near the Guadiana.
At eleven in the morning, we debouched from Medellin to draw up in order of battle. A short way from the town, we formed into the arc of a very compact circle, between the Guadiana and a ravine planted with trees and vineyards, which stretches from Medellin to Mingabril. General Lasalle s division of light cavalry was stationed on the left, the German legion of infantry in the centre, and the dragoons of General Latour Maubourg on the right. The divisions of Vilatte and Ruffin formed the reserve. Numerous detachments, from the three divisions which composed the first line, had been left in the rear of the army, to preserve our communications; and their strength did not exceed 7000 soldiers. The enemy before us presented an immense line of more than 34,000 men.
The German legion began the attack. The 2d and 4th regiments of dragoons having next made a charge against the Spanish infantry, were repulsed with loss, and the German division remained alone in the middle of the fight. They formed into a square, and courageously withstood the redoubled fury of the enemy as long as the action continued. With much difficulty, Marshal Victor renewed the combat, by causing two regiments of Vilatte s division to advance. The enemy s cavalry at first endeavoured to carry our right wing, but without success. Part of them then rushed en masse on our left, which, afraid of being surrounded, was forced to fall back on the Guadiana, where it makes an angle, and contracts the plain towards Medellin. For two hours we retired slowly and quietly, facing about every fifty paces to present our front to the enemy, and to dispute our ground with them before yielding it, when they attempted to seize it by force.
Amid the endless whizzing of bullets flying over our heads, and the deafening roar of bomb-shells rending the air, and tearing up the earth around us, we heeded only the voice of our commanders. They gave their orders with the greater coolness and deliberation, the fiercer grew the enemy s attack. The farther we retired, the louder shouted our foes. Their sharp-shooters were so numerous and daring, that they sometimes compelled ours to fall into the ranks. They called to us at a distance, in their own language, that no quarter would be given, and that the plains of Medellin would be the tomb of the French. If our squadron had given way and fled, the cavalry of the Spanish right would have assaulted the rear of our army through the breach, and surrounded it completely. Then the field of Medellin would, indeed, have been our grave, as our enemies declared.
General Lasalle rode backward and forward in front of his division, in a lofty and fearless manner. When the enemy s cavalry came within gun-shot, the sharp-shooters of both sides retired. In the space which separated us, there might then be seen the horses of dead friends and foes, running on every side, most of them wounded, some of them dragging their masters under their feet, and struggling to free themselves of the unmanageable load.
The Spaniards had sent against our single squadron six of their best, who advanced in close column with the Xeres lancers at their head. This solid mass all at once began to trot, with the intention of charging us while we made our retrograde movement. The captain of our squadron commanded his four platoons, which did not in all exceed 120 men, to wheel half round, at a walking pace, to the right. This being done, he straightened his line with as much self-possession as if no enemy had been near. The Spanish horse, struck with astonishment at his coolness, insensibly slackened their pace. The leader of the squadron took advantage of their surprise, and immediately gave the signal to charge.
Our hussars, who had hitherto preserved, amid the incessant threats and abuses of the enemy, a deep unbroken silence, now drowned the shrill clangour of the trumpet, as they dashed forward with one tremendous shout of joy and rage. The Spanish lancers, horror-struck, stopped short, and, turning round at half pistol-shot, overturned their own cavalry behind them. Terror so impaired their judgment, that they could not look at each other, but believed every one to be their enemy. Our hussars rushed impetuously among them, and hewed them down without opposition. We chased them to the rear of their army, when the trumpets sounded a recall, and we returned, to form our squadron once more in order of battle. A little while after our charge, all the Spanish cavalry of the right and left had completely abandoned the field.
Our dragoons now drew up around their chosen companions, and, perceiving an irresolution in the enemy s infantry, on seeing the flight of their cavalry, we improved our advantage, and made a most brilliant and fortunate charge against the centre of their army. At the same time, two, regiments of Vilatte s division attacked with success the right of the enemy's infantry, near the heights of Mingabril. In an instant, the army opposed to us disappeared like clouds before the wind. The Spaniards threw away their arms and fled. The cannonade closed, and every corps of our cavalry joined in the pursuit.
Our soldiers, who had lately been threatened with certain death, if they had been overpowered, and were enraged by five hours resistance, at first gave no quarter. The infantry followed the cavalry at a distance, and despatched the wounded with their bayonets. The vengeance of our soldiers fell chiefly on such of the Spaniards as were without a military uniform.
The hussars and dragoons who had gone abroad to forage, soon returned, guarding whole columns of Spaniards, whom they intrusted to the foot-soldiers to take to Medellin. Those very men, who had denounced us for slaughter with such confidence before the battle, now marched with humble aspect, crouching for fear. At every threatening sign made by our soldiers, they ran together like sheep when chased by dogs, squeezing to get to the middle of the crowd. Every time they met a body of French troops, they exclaimed with vehenience, ""— "Life to Napoleon and his brave army!" Now and then a passing horseman would take a pleasure in exacting these acclamations for himself, which were due alone to the victors as a whole.
A certain colonel who was a courtier, and an aid-de-camp of King Joseph s, looking at the prisoners as they filed past the regiments, called to them in Spanish to shout a "Vive" for King Joseph. They seemed at first not to comprehend his meaning, but after a moment s silence, they raised their old cry, "Long live Napoleon and his invincible troops!" The colonel then turned to a particular prisoner, and enforced his order with threats. The Spaniard having exclaimed "Viva Joseph!" an officer, who, as usual, had not been disarmed, approached his country s soldier, and ran his sword through his body. Our enemies were willing enough to do homage to our bravery; but they would not, even in their humiliation, recognise the power of a master not of their own choice.
A little before night I returned to Medellin. Silence and peace had succeeded the turmoil of battle and the peals of victory. In the plain alone there might be heard the wailings of the wounded, and the low murmurings of the dying, who raised their heads before they breathed their last to pray to God and the Holy Virgin. Death had impressed on the countenances of the slain, the expression of the passions which animated them at the moment they expired. Those who had been struck down when flying, were lying on their breast or side, with drooping heads, and fear-contracted muscles. Those again who had died while fighting bravely, retained, even when fallen, the aspect of defiance. Two regiments of Swiss and Walloon guards were stretched on the ground in the very ranks in which they had fought. Broken ammunition-waggons and cannon abandoned by their teams of mules, still marked the position of the Spaniards. Here and there lay wounded horses, whose limbs being shattered by the bullets, they could not rise from the spot where they were doomed to perish. Ignorant of death, and unconscious of futurity, they browsed on the grass around them as far as they could reach.
The loss of the French did not exceed 4000. The Spaniards left 12,000 dead on the field of battle, and 19 pieces of artillery. We made 7000 or 8000 prisoners, but scarcely 2000 of these arrived at Madrid. The Spanish captive in his own country could easily effect his escape.
The inhabitants of the towns and villages assembled in great numbers in the way of the French escorts, and withdrew their attention from their charge. They took care to leave their doors open, and the prisoners, mixing with the crowd in passing, darted into the houses, whose doors were instantly shut. Our soldiers, whose humanity returned when the combat was over, winked at their flight, notwithstanding the strictness of the orders they had received.
The Spanish prisoners would address some grenadier of the guard, and, pointing to some distant village, with a heavy sigh, would say in their own language, "Senior Soldado," &c. "Mr Soldier, that is our home; there are our wives and children; must we pass so near, and never see them more? Must we leave them all to go to far off France?" The grenadier, affecting to speak sternly, would reply, "I am commanded to shoot you if I perceive you attempt to run away, but I don t see behind me." He would then step a little forward, and the prisoners, taking to the fields, would soon rejoin their armies. We were at last obliged to escort our prisoners with soldiers from the German Legion, their national character, and a stricter discipline, rendering them more vigilant and inflexible.
Part of our regiment was quartered at Mingabril, on the very field where the battle bad been fought, and where it raged the hottest. We lived among carcasses, and often saw proceeding from them thick black vapours, which the winds bore away to spread contagion and disease through the surrounding country. The oxen of La Mesta, that usually winter on the banks of the Guadiana, fled affrighted from their wonted pastures. Their mournful bellowings, and the endless howling of the dogs that watched them, declared that undefined feeling of terror with which they were impressed.
Thousands of huge vultures collected from all parts of Spain in that vast lonely valley of death. Perched on the heights, and, seen far off between and the horizon, they seemed as large as men. Our videttes more than once marched towards them to reconnoitre, mistaking them for an enemy. These birds would not leave their human repast on our approach, until we came within a few yards of them; then the beating of their vast pinions above our heads resounded far and near, like the funereal echoes of the tomb.
The day before the battle of Medellin, or Merida, a complete victory was obtained by General Sebastiani, near Ciudad Real, in La Mancha, over the Spanish army stationed to defend the defiles of the Sierra-Morena. This victory of Ciudad Real, along with that which we gained at Medellin, struck terror into the remotest corners of Andalusia, and for a while, every route through it remained open to the French.
Notwithstanding these two severe losses, the Spanish Government did not despond. Like the Roman Senate, which voted thanks to the consul Varro, after the defeat of Cannae, because he did not despair of the safety of Rome, the Supreme Junta of Seville decreed, that Cuesta and his army had merited the gratitude of Spain, and they adjudged them the same rewards as if they had been successful. To have censured Cuesta and his army, in the present desperate state of affairs, would have been to confess themselves conquered. Fifteen days after the action at Medellin, the Spanish army had retrieved all its losses, and had thrown itself between our march and the passes of the mountains, with a force nearly 30,000 strong.
General Sebastiani advanced no further in La Mancha than Santa Crux de la Mudella, and our corps cantoned between the Tagus and the Guadiana. We could not move in advance of that river, without seeing numerous new levies of Spaniards immediately raised in our rear, and having our only communications with Madrid by the bridge of Almarez intercepted. Besides, we had heard nothing for a long time of Marshal Soult s army, which should have entered Portugal, and with which our right was to have formed a junction and co-operated.
The French army in the north of the Peninsula did not meet with the same degree of success as we obtained by our superior discipline in the plains of Estremadura and La Mancha. These troops, commanded by Marshal Soult and Ney, had to carry on a warfare in a mountainous region, where the activity, numbers, and local knowledge of the natives, could at any time enable them to elude all the calculations of military skill, and all the experience of our greatest leaders.
After the retreat of General Moore, and the capitulation of Corunna and Ferrol, in the month of January, Marshal Soult proceeded in the direction of Portugal by San Jago, Vigo, and Tuy. Finding it impossible to cross the Minho, near its mouth, under the fire of the Portuguese forts on the opposite bank, he went up the river to Orense, where he passed it on the 6th of March. He completely routed on the 7th, the army of the Marquis de la Romana on the heights of Orsuna, near Monte Rey, and compelled the remains of that force to take refuge among the high mountains of Puebla de Senabria.
Chaves, a frontier town of Portugal, was invested by him on the 13th, and surrendered by capitulation. He entered Braga on the 19th, after having forced the pass of Carvalho d Esté, one of the strongest positions of Portugal. Oporto, defended by an intrenched camp and 270 cannon, was taken by storm on the 29th; and the advanced guard of his army passed the Douro, and marched for Vouga, forty-five leagues distant from Lisbon.
The French had scarcely entered Oporto victoriously, when the garrisons they had left behind to overawe the country, and preserve the communications, were every where seized. The Portuguese troops of the fortress of Caminha, situated at the mouth of the Minho, crossed that river on the 10th of March, and were reinforced by a great number of Spanish marines, and the inhabitants of the Galician shores, who had taken arms under the orders of their clergy. They fortified the bridge of San Payo against the French, who might come from San Jago; and forced the cities of Vigo and Tuy to capitulate, where Marshal Soult had left garrisons and the magazines and depots of his corps d armée. The Portuguese general, Francisco Silveira, who on the first approach of the French, had retired to Villa-Pouca, made himself master also of Chaves, on the 21st of March. After this, he proceeded to Amarante on the Tamega, to guard that important station, and harass the French detachments and rear-guards in the neighbourhood of Oporto.
The Marquis de la Romana, on the 30th of March, descended from the mountains of Puebla de Sanabria with several thousand men, the fragments of his vanquished force. He marched to Ponteferrada, and made a few Frenchmen prisoners, found some ammunition and provisions, and seized a damaged twelve-pounder, which he repaired. He then crossed the Castile road, and, with the help of his single cannon, obtained possession of Villa-Franca, and made the garrison of 800 men prisoners of war. On the news of these trivial successes, his army increased like a snow-ball of the mountains, which enlarges as it rolls down, and becomes a mighty avalanche. Romana obliged Marshal Ney to abandon Bierzo, and concentrate his troops at Lugo ;—.he then threw himself into Asturias, and raised Galicia also in arms.
The two French corps of Galicia and Portugal, having thus had their communications destroyed, were now completely isolated, and separated from the rest of our troops. They could no longer aid each other, or co-operate to further the common design of the general operations of the war. Their strength was now spent in a succession of partial actions, which were of no advantage.
Every effort of Marshal Ney s to terrify Galicia to submission, was vain. Instead of being restrained by severity, their hatred against the French was more indignantly roused. Violent measures were retaliated with still more barbarous reprisals, which always happens where there is a spark of patriotism. Whole squadrons, whole battalions, were butchered by the peasants in a night s time. Seven hundred French prisoners were drowned in the Minho all at once, by command of Don Pedro de Barrios, Governor of Galicia, for the Junta. Instead of diminishing with our weakness, the rage of the people became daily more inflamed.
The inhabitants of Portugal, as well as those of Galicia, had risen universally in arms. They opposed the French with 70,000 militia, and 12,000 regular troops. It was impossible for Marshal Soult to keep the country in subjection behind him, and advance against Lisbon with only 22,000 men. Still, for more than forty days he remained in Oporto, vainly endeavouring to re-establish his interrupted correspondence. For months, he had received neither orders nor reinforcements; and he dared not make a retrograde movement, for fear of prejudicing the operations of other corps of our army, regarding whose positions he knew nothing. On the 2d of May, he at length determined that the bridge of Amarante, on the Tamega should be seized by General Loison s division, in order to depart from Portugal by the route of Braganza.
Whilst this enterprise was going on, the French picquets on the Vouga were attacked by the English on the 10th of May, and they crossed the Douro the day following. The English, who had returned to Portugal after the retreat of Sir John Moore, were reduced to 15,000 men; and they dared not at first land their heavy baggage and artillery, but kept themselves ready to embark again on the first approach of the French. On the 4th, and again on the 22d of April, they had received considerable reinforcements; and they advanced against Oporto upwards of 23,000 strong.
The French quitted that city on the 12th of May, and their rear-guard had a skirmish with the van of the English. Marshal Soult was pursued, and encircled by a triple army; the first, commanded by General Sir A. Wellesley, never lost sight of his rear; the second was the Anglo-Portuguese army, under General Beresford, which took the direction of Chaves, by Lamega and Amarante, keeping up with the Marshal s right; the third was commanded by the Portuguese General, Francisco Silveira, which preceded the other two, to cut off the French from the passes of Ruivaes, between Salamonde and Montalègre.
Marshal Soult, finding the route by Chaves occupied by Marshal Beresford, rapidly concentrated his army on Braga, and directed his march by the mountain road for Orense. He crossed sixty leagues of an insurgent territory, without sustaining any other very material loss than his heavy baggage and artillery, which he lost among ways that were impassable. The English advanced no further than Montalègre, but returned immediately towards the Tagus, and the neighbourhood of Lisbon.
Marshal Soult arrived at Lugo in Galicia on the 22d of May, relieved the garrison of this town, which the Spaniards had besieged, and opened a communication with Marshal Ney, who was returned from an expedition against Oviedo, in the Asturias. A few days afterwards he resumed the offensive, against the army of the Marquis de la Romana, and followed it by Monforte, Ponteferrada, Bollo, and Viana; but it eluded his pursuit. Leaving Galicia, he then proceeded to Zamora by Puebla de Sanabria, for the purpose of following the movement of the English, who appeared to be moving towards the Tagus in Estremadura, against Marshal Victor's corps.
Marshal Ney was obliged to retire into the kingdom of Leon, after Marshal Soult had departed. He had been unable to make any permanent footing in Galicia and the Asturias, having been constantly prevented by the villagers, and numerous peasant. armies, whose strength daily increased, and could not be subdued.
In those mountainous provinces of the north of the Peninsula, though the French never failed to conquer in pitched battles with their enemies, they were, nevertheless, assailed incessantly by clouds of armed mountaineers; who, without venturing to engage in close array, or corps against corps, always retired from rock to rock, and from one position to another among the heights, firing perpetually even when flying.
It was often necessary to send a whole battalion to carry orders to another near at hand. The wounded, the exhausted, or the diseased French soldier, who laggared for a moment behind his column, was soon sent to another world. After one battle was gained, we required to commence another conflict immediately. The persevering invincible spirit of the Spaniards, rendered our victories valueless. The French armies melted away for want of rest, amid their constant toils, watchings, and distresses.
Such are the events that had passed in the north of Spain, and prevented our corps d armée of Estremadura and La Mancha, from profiting by their signal victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real. The army of Arragon had also been obliged to suspend its operations, by the French being necessitated to recall from that province the corps of Marshal Victor to Valladolid, to carry succours to Marshal Ney, and re-establish a line of communication in Galicia.
The French army in Spain had received no reinforcements to recruit its daily losses, since the campaign of Austria, and the departure of the Emperor Napoleon. Instead of being concentrated, it had, under the command of King Joseph, continued to spread itself more every day throughout the Peninsula. Weak on all points, because we were too much dispersed, we were enfeebled even by our conquests. In contending with the insurgent peasants of Galicia, of Portugal, and of the Asturias, we had lost that character of invincibleness, which was even more mighty than the actual force by which we had conquered so many countries.
King Joseph had acted as commander-in-chief since the departure of the Emperor. He believed that he could in Spain, as well as in Naples, by the well-known mildness of his temper, attach the people to his new sceptre, whom the power of our arms had subdued. He had allowed the French armies to advance every where in the Peninsula, for the sole end of organizing new provinces, and extending his sway over a greater extent of territory. Thus he had bartered away the military strength of the armies of Galicia and Portugal, concerning whom we knew nothing, for five whole months.
King Joseph had contracted indolent habits on the peaceful throne of Naples. Surrounded by flatterers, and some beguiling Spaniards, he resigned himself to foolish hopes. In place of attending to the army, he staid in his capital, immersed in effeminacy, and sighing after the luxuries of Italy. He wished to reign and sleep at Madrid, as he had done at Naples, even before we had won for him, if that were possible, a kingdom at the hazard of our lives.
He filled the columns of his Gazettes with decrees that were never enforced, and were scarcely ever read. He bestowed on one church the wax and consecrated vessels of another, long ago plundered by the French, or despoiled by the Spaniards themselves. He was prodigal in bestowing the decorations of his Royal order on his courtiers, who dared not wear them beyond the precincts of those places we occupied, for fear of being assassinated by the peasants of Spain. He made several promotions in his Royal army, which had not yet a being. He gave, in expectation, the places of governors, administrators, and judges, in the remotest provinces of his kingdom in both hemispheres; while he durst not sleep in any of his country-houses only a few leagues out of Madrid. He pulled down old houses, as his brother had done at Paris, intending to embellish his capital; but he wanted money to erect the new edifices, and his liberality extended no further than removing the rubbish.
To conciliate the people, he studied to imitate his predecessors Charles IV., and Ferdinand VII., by all possible methods, in their ostentatious pomp, their formality, and even their trifling sanctity. He walked himself with the processions in the streets of Madrid, and made the officers of his staff and the soldiers of his body-guard follow him, carrying lighted tapers. All this assumed piety, this affectation of munificence, this hypocritical liberality, had no other effect but to make him be ridiculed, when the terror, which ennobled all, was dissipated after the departure of the Emperor.
The Spaniards took delight in spreading a report, that King Joseph was addicted to drunkenness, and that he was blind of an eye. This story made a deep impression on the minds of the country people, although nothing could be more unfounded. It was in vain that he endeavoured to destroy these prejudices, by showing himself frequently in public, and looking every passenger full in the face. The people, nevertheless, believed that he had but one eye.
On the day of his coronation, all ranks were admitted gratis to the places of public amusement, and, at one of the theatres, a farce was exhibited, called "Harlequin, Emperor of the Moon." Several times during the representations of the piece, the people openly applied passages of it to the ephemeral condition of King Joseph at Madrid. Devotees, who were accustomed to ejaculate in their conversation Jesus, Maria, y Joseph, would stop short after repeating the first two names, and, after a pause, would adopt the periphrasis, y el Padre de nuestor Senior, "and the Father of our Lord." They were afraid lest they would bring down blessings on King Joseph, by naming him who was regarded as his patron saint in heaven.
The good-nature of King Joseph came at last, by the French themselves, to be reckoned a defect. His ardent desire to make himself beloved by his new subjects, did real detriment to the success of military operations. The Spaniards had always the right, and the French the wrong side, in any case of complaint. We were frequently without food in districts that had submitted for the moment; not daring to exact there, as from enemies, the provisions we required. Our soldiers expired by hundreds, in the hospitals of Burgos and Madrid, in want of the most necessary articles.
After successful engagements, he would go to the Retiro to swear in the prisoners sent thither by the army, and declare to them that they had been misled by villains, and that he, their King, desired only their welfare, and their country s happiness. The prisoners, expecting to be shot before night, would first take the oath of fidelity he exacted; and, when armed and accoutred, they would then desert, and return to their armies. This made our soldiers term King Joseph "The principal administrator and organizer general of the military depots of the Supreme Junta of Seville."
The French Generals and Marshals were unwilling to obey a man whom they could not recognise as a Frenchman, now that he was acknowledged King of Spain. They even often tried to contradict and displease him, that they might be remanded back to Germany. They wished to abandon this irregular war, which was both unpopular with the army, and deprived them of the chance of being distinguished, or obtaining higher promotion, by fighting under the eye of the Emperor. The Spanish war was impoverishing France, without kindling the military enthusiasm of the nation.
King Joseph had neither sufficient authority or military genius, nor enough of self-confidence to direct the operations, which the unforeseen changes of general affairs rendered indispensably necessary. He dared not issue any orders, without consulting his brother. The plans came all from Paris or Germany; sometimes they arrived too late, and at best they could only be imperfectly executed, by one who had no share in their formation. The French army in Spain was totally devoid of that unity of action, without which the simplest operations of war cannot prosper.
In the month of April, the corps .of Marshal Victor, to which we belonged, left for a time its cantonments on the Guadiana, between Merida and Medellin; and approached the Tagus and Alcantara, to unite with the division of Lapisse, which had proposed terms of surrender to Ciudad Rodrigo, but without effect. A division of the Marshal s corps crossed that river on the 14th of May, after a slight engagement with the Portuguese militia, and proceeded once more to Alcantara. The 8th was spent reconnoitring in the direction of Castel. Blanco; but having learned that 8000 English and Portuguese were in possession of Abrantes, they conjectured that Marshal Soult s expedition against Lisbon had failed, and therefore they returned. Marshal Victor then collected together his troops in the vicinity of Truxillo, between the Guadiana and the Tagus, to secure his communications by the bridge of Almarez, to cover Madrid, and observe the army of Cuesta. The fourth corps, commanded by General Sebastiani, had continued in La Mancha since the engagement at Ciudad-Real.
On the 20th of May, the officers and subalterns of the fourth squadron of all the cavalry regiments in the army, received orders from the Minister of War to return to the head depots of their regiments, in order to raise additional squadrons. In consequence of this appointment, I quitted Spain, and on my arrival in France, was sent against the English on the coast of Flanders. Their expedition against the fleet and dockyards at Antwerp having failed, through the slowness and indecision of their leader, I returned to Spain at the commencement of the following year.
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