Still despondency had taken a complete possession of his mind. In this very letter, he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had arisen too late, and that the French were too strong to be coped with in this manner. In the morning he wrote a second letter, desiring Sir David to march upon Astorga. "We must be at hand," said he, "to aid and take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country, and our duty, demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended. But he added, "I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for, if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it." These words proved but too ominous. It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotic spirit of the Spaniards, and what was worse, in his own means of opposing the French, however great the natural strength of the country. It was evident, likewise, that whilst those impressions weighed upon him, he was looking forward with dread to the opinion of his countrymen at home; and that, in deference to that, he was sacrificing his own sentiments. Charmilly being in the dark as to the determination which had been formed, supposed, naturally enough that his second letter was yet necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The General, astonished that Mr Frere should depute Charmilly on such a duty, and feeling, like a proud, high spirited man, who had been deeply injured, tore the letter in pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in no measured terms. Part of his indignation he permitted to fall upon Charmilly; and on the succeeding day he ordered him to quit Salamanca.
Charmilly represented to him that he had not deserved such treatment. General Moore replied, that he did not mean to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was of course obeyed. notwithstanding his resentment, however, for what he conceived an improper interference of the ambassador, he soon recollected what was due to him as the representative of his Sovereign, and therefore wrote a sort of apologetic letter to Mr Frere, saying that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters delivered by Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. "I certainly," said he, "did feel and express much indignation to a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He farther informed the minister that every thing should be done for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could be expected from such an army as he commanded. But he could not make a direct movement upon Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and Somo-Sierra were in the hands of the French; and, his force was much too weak, till joined by that of Sir David Baird.
On the following day, Sir John received a letter from the Junta of Toledo, telling him that they intended to reunite the dispersed armies there, and defend the city to the last.
He replied, that if the Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain; and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push on his troops by brigades to Benevente. But on the 9th, Colonel Graham, whom he had despatched to confer with the Duke of Castelfranco and Don Thomas Morla, returned from Talavera, with the tidings that these men had surrendered Madrid. The number of the French there was computed at between 20,000 and 30,000 men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having as yet taken possession of the city, on account of the temper of the inhabitants. Another part of the French army was employed in laying siege, for a second time, to Zaragoza. From Toledo the news were equally discouraging; for Marshal Victor had no sooner approached that place, than it had been given up to his troops. All this, however, did not induce General Moore to alter his plan; his object was to threaten the communications of the French, withdraw their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and thus encourage any movements which might be projected by the armies which were to be again formed on the south bank of the Tagus. If no advantage should be taken of it, and no efforts made, he foresaw that the French might turn against him whatever portion of their forces they chose. That they would be enabled to do so, he fully expected; and he conceived that nothing which his army could effect, would be attended with any other recompense than that of gaining additional renown for the British arms. He looked, therefore, to a retreat as an event which would soon be unavoidable; and in his despatches to the Ministry at home, he dissuaded them from sending out reinforcements, but desired that transports might be ready, both at Lisbon and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being in his own mind thoroughly persuaded, that all the efforts of Britain would prove unavailing, and that it would be necessary to evacuate and abandon the Peninsula.
In this melancholy state of feeling, having resolved upon advancing, he wrote to the Marques de la Romana, who was then at Leon, collecting and refitting the scattered remains of Blake's army. Sir John complained to the Marques, that he had been put in no communication with any of the Spanish armies; that he had been kept entirely in the dark with respect to their movements, and the plans both of the Generals and of the Government; and that, while his army was marching to assemble and unite itself, he had been left exposed without the least support. Therefore, though his inclinations had ever been to cooperate with the Spaniards, it became necessary for him, finding that he was left to himself, to think of himself alone. Under that feeling, he had ordered the corps at Astorga to fall back upon Corunna, and had meant to retire with his own corps on Portugal, there to be in readiness to assist Spain whenever its affairs should be put in better management, and any opportunity should offer for benefiting it. Perhaps this opportunity had now occurred ; and as his retreat had been against his wishes, he had stopped it the first moment a chance of acting to advantage had offered. His wish now was to unite with the Marques, for whose character he had the highest respect; and who would always find him ready to undertake whatever was practicable for the service of the Spanish nation. The account which Romana gave of his army, in reply, was far from encouraging; - he had 20,000 men under arms, but they were almost without haversacks, cartridge boxes and shoes, and at least two thirds were without clothing from head to foot. Their spirits, however, were good, and if they were well fed, they would do their duty. Their dispersion in Biscay had been wholly owing to their want of subsistence. He should not doubt of uniting with Sir John, and concerting a decisive attack upon the troops which surrounded Madrid, were it not for a division of 8000 or 10,000 men extending from Sahagun to Almanza, whose apparent object was to check his army. As long as they remained in that position, he could not abandon his own, because it would leave them a free access to the Asturias, and they would then occupy that country, from whence be drew large supplies; and they would also threaten the passage into Galicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird might force the enemy to fall back upon Reynosa, and then it would not be difficult for him, Romana, to join.
From the commencement, Sir John Moore had always thought of the Spaniards with so much dispondency, that this account of the forces with which he was to cooperate could make no alteration in his prospects. It was perfectly his feeling that he must stand or fall by his own efforts. He left Salamanca, therefore, on the 12th December, and on the same day, Lord Paget, (now Marquis of Anglesea), with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro de Torredesillas; and General Stuart, (now Lord Londonderry), surprised and cut off a party of French who were posted at Rueda. This was the first encounter between the British and French in Spain, and the prisoners declared, that it was universally believed that the English army had retreated. On the 14th when Sir John was at Aluejos, a packet of intercepted letters from the head-quarters of the French army was brought to him; the officer who had been charged with them having been killed by the Spanish peasantry. Among them was a letter from Berthier to Marshal Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora. It was said that he would have no English to combat in his front, for every thing evinced that they were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera on the road towards Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they were not already gone, and when they had retired, the Emperor thought Soult could do as he pleased. From this letter it appeared that Soult had two divisions with him at Saldanha; that Junot was collecting together another at Burgos; and that a fourth under Mortier (Duke of Treviso) had been ordered to march against Zaragoza. Sir John had intended to march towards Valladolid; but being now made aware that Soult was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move to Toro, and there unite his army, Sir David Baird doing the like at Benevente; from whence the two corps might be united either by a forward or flank movement, and strike a blow at Soult before that General could be reinforced.
While the head-quarters were at Toro, a member of the Central Junta arrived there, accompanied by Mr Stuart. After the manner in which Colonel Charmilly had been dismissed, Mr Frere had but little reason to hope that General Moore would alter his resolution of leaving Spain in despair. The Spanish Government had, however, entreated him to make one other effort, for if that resolve were persisted in, they said, it would bring on the most dreadful results. The measures which could alone save Portugal and Spain would be completely deranged, and Britain would have afforded them assistance only to make them rely upon an effective aid, and then to withdraw it at the critical moment when it was most required. That in truth the enemy at this moment exposed himself to destruction, by dividing his army to cover so extended a line. Romana would join Sir John Moore with 14,000 men, and they, the Junta, had taken such measures, that within a month 30,000 more would be raised in Leon, Galicia, and the Asturias. Mr Frere enclosed this note to the British General; and reminding him of the immense responsibility with which he would charge himself in adopting a measure which must be followed by immediate, if not final ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources he was intrusted, expressed a hope that Mr Stuart, who was personally esteemed by the General, would, from that advantage, be enabled to urge this argument with the warmth of regard. "I am unwilling," he proceeded, "to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence; which, with such an interest at stake, I feel unwilling to excite. But this I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose." This letter arrived too late to have any influence upon Sir John's movements, for he had already advanced, though with a heavy heart: and when the deputy from the Junta, Don Francisco Xavier Caro, at this time offered him the command of the Spanish armies - he refused it! Assuredly he would not have done this, if he had had any hope of acting with success against the enemy, or any intention of making a stand against them for at this time he learned that Romana was beginning to retire upon Galicia, and felt how inconvenient it was, that the army which was to co-operate with him should be quite independent of him. He therefore wrote to the Marques to say, that he had expected the assistance of such parts of his corps as were fit to move; and had expected also, that the road to Corunna would have been left open for the British army; being that by which it must receive its supplies, and the only one by which it could retreat, if compelled so to do. Romana replied, that he himself should have had no thought of retreating had it not been for the intelligence which he had received from Sir David Baird; but that he was ready to act with Sir John - and that, in his mind, this was the moment, not for retreating, but for trying what could be done against the enemy, and withdrawing his forces from the capital.
At length, on the 20th December, the junction with the forces under Sir David Baird was formed at Mayorga. The united force now amounted to little more than 28,900 men, of whom 2450 were cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery. The cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed forward, and having learned that some of the enemy's horse were posted at Sahagun, his Lordship endeavoured to cut them off. The alarm was unluckily communicated to them too soon, so that they had time to turn out and form themselves in a vineyard, in which the vine stumps were covered by the snow, but they were out-manoeuvred, charged, and over-thrown in a moment, and dispersed in all directions, with the loss of many killed, and 157 prisoners, including two lieutenant-colonels. In this affair about 400 of the 15th Hussars encountered nearly 700 French, and the British felt and proved their own superiority. Head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun on the 21st. The weather was severe, the roads bad, and deeply covered with snow; and as the troops had already suffered from forced marches, they halted for a day, and there a co-operation with Romana was finally concerted, the Marques engaging to move with from 9000 to 10,000 men, being all that part of his force which was sufficiently clothed and armed to take the field. Wretched as their condition seemed, when they were compared to troops so admirably equipped as the British, still it was apparent, even to a despondent observer, that they might be brought into action as auxiliaries, to occupy part of the enemy's force, and to complete his destruction in case of victory.
According to the best information which Romana had been able to procure, the corps of Soult consisted of about 9000 infantry and 1000 horse. But that general, fearing that some attempt would be made against him, had applied for reinforcements, and, without waiting for them, called to his assistance the nearest troops; so that he had thus brought together about 18,000 men, whom he had posted behind the river Carrion. Every arrangement was now made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly; and never had such been more welcome to a British army. The Convents in Sahagun were prepared for the reception of the future wounded; and the soldiers expected in confidence a glorious victory. But not so the General. "The movement I am making," he wrote to Mr Frere, "is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause; and that we do not abandon it till long after the Spaniards had abandoned us." In serious truth, nothing had yet been done; but he was disgusted with the Spanish Government, and he had no faith in the people: his own judgment would have led him to fall back even from Salamanca; and he only advanced, because he knew what would be the feelings of the people of England, if their army had retired without doing any thing. Offended, too, with Mr Frere, he did not consider the suggestion of that minister as to making a stand at Astorga worthy of consideration. It was at once rejected as unavailing; and he advanced against this detachment of the French, under an impression that no possible benefit could result even from a victory, except in so far as it went to maintain the reputation of the British troops. "It was necessary to risk the army," were his words, "to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other good than the character it will attach to the British army."
At the appointed hour in the evening, the whole force was under arms; the right column had begun its march; and the remainder were in high spirits expecting the word of command, when at this moment a letter from Romana arrived, with intelligence that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Salamanca or Valladolid. Information to the same import was received by other messengers, and also that considerable reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that the troops should return to their quarters, and by daybreak next morning be again under arms. The next morning, General Hope fell back upon Mayorga, on the road to Benevente, with his own and General Fraser's division. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river Ezla, at Valencia de Don Juan. On Christmas day, the Commander-in-chief followed General Hope with the reserve, and the brigade of light troops; and the cavalry under Lord Paget followed the reserve on the 26th. When Sir John Moore wrote to Romana, that he should fall back, he told him that if he were pursued, he should halt and give battle; and in his second communication from Sahagun, he said, that if he. should be pressed upon after passing the Ezla, he should not object to trying an action; but he had made up his mind to lose a part of his baggage, and not to fight if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying point; there he said he should stand, as his retreat from thence, if necessary, would be secure; and he should be in the way to receive all the supplies and reinforcements which he expected from England. At the worst he could defend himself, and with Romana's aid, protect Galicia. "You may rest assured," these were his words, "that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from being intercepted.... You will find no inclination in me to abandon the Spanish cause." But his succeeding despatches from Benevente on the 28th, show that this determination was soon laid aside, and as for the reinforcements, he had already countermanded them. His force, he said, when he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000; Romana could not have above 8000. The army moving against him he reckoned at not less than 50,000, and it was said that Napoleon himself was coming with at least 10,000 of his Imperial Guards. His real interest was, not to remain longer at Astorga than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca del Bierzo, where he had heard there was a good position. Romana had announced to him, some time before, his own intention of retiring into Galicia by this very route; but Sir John requested that it might be left open to the English, as it was the only way they had for their retreat or supplies.
Between the 22d and 24th, Soult received such reinforcements, as made his army superior in numbers to the British. Junot, too, had advanced again as far as Palencia. Napoleon was hastening from Madrid with his Imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that quarter. The force under Lefebvre had been counter-ordered from the road towards Badajoz, and directed upon Salamanca. The retreat of our troops upon Portugal was thus cut off. Of the numbers really advancing against him, Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying when he commenced his retreat, that it had been resolved to carry off the prisoners; who were accordingly stowed in our covered tilt-waggons. A thaw came on, on the day when we first began to fall back; on the following day it rained incessantly; and as the soil in those parts is a deep loam, the roads were above a foot deep. The flying proclamations of the French even overtook our army; these were as usual filled with lying promises and real menaces. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain, to emancipate the people from a tyrannical aristocracy, and a fanatic priesthood. That all persons who should remain quiet in their houses, or who, having fled, should return speedily, should receive no harm; but that, otherwise, their dwellings and goods should be confiscated, without exception. Unluckily, the conduct of our troops now began to give effect to these handbills. The soldiers were exasperated against the Spaniards for their indolence and supineness; they were also enraged by the conduct of some poor peasants, whose carts had been pressed to carry the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had fled with their mules during the night, because the movements of a retreating army exposed their own persons to imminent hazard, and their mules to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened, in want both of rest and food, disappointed in all their fond hopes of victory, and indignant at being compelled to turn their backs upon an enemy whom they despised, and would so eagerly have met in battle; it was no doubt a relief for them to vent these their feelings, in transports of rage, upon the only objects within their reach. In this frame of mind they commenced a scene of plunder and havoc as they went along; and the officers, many of whom already murmured loudly at the excessive rapidity of the retreat, and were discontented with the stern silence which the commander-in-chief maintained respecting his future measures, did not exert themselves, as they ought to have done, to prevent these excesses.
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