The news of the defeat and dispersion of the army of Castanos arrived but too soon. It excited no surprise in the breast of Sir John Moore, it being his opinion, that the south of Spain ought to have been the scene chosen for the struggle; that Cadiz, not Corunna, should have been the port of disembarkation, and Seville or Cordoba the place for uniting the British army. He now therefore resolved to retreat upon Portugal; for thus, as he stated in a letter to the British ambassador at Madrid, he should fall back upon his resources, cover a country where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detached a force against him, and be ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible. That such circumstances, however, would occur, he had no expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do in order to subdue the country than to march over it; though, after the conquest, they might find the Spaniards somewhat troublesome as subjects. In his letter to Sir David, ordering him to fail back upon Corunna, and sail from thence for the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order that transports might be sent to Lisbon, - adding, "they will be wanted; for, when the French have gotten Spain, Portugal cannot be defended." Only few days previously, he had written to Lord Castlereagh, stating that he had ordered a magazine of provisions for a short consumption to be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas; in which case the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off the army. Beyond this, he thought that the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal ought not to be thought of. In making known his resolution of retiring to the British Government, he wrote in the same desponding strain. "If the French," said he, "succeed in Spain, it will be in vain to resist them in Portugal." Portugal could not be defended against a superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south; and the English might still be of use if they were landed at Cadiz. "But," added he, "it is impossible to be very sanguine on this subject after what has been seen."
When this intention of retreating was made known in Salamanca to the army, murmurings against it broke forth in all quarters from all ranks. Nay, even the very officers on Sir John's own staff, lamented the resolution of their commander. In his letter to Mr Frere, penned before the defeat of Castanos was known, Sir John had proposed as a question, what course the British army should adopt in case of that event, - whether he should order its retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into the heart of the country, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation? - admitting too, that "this movement would be one of great hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain, and he would be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats. The question," he went on to say, "is not purely a military one. It belongs, at least, as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the means you have had of judging of the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. You are, perhaps, better acquainted with the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine. It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered. It is comparatively of very little on whom should rest the greatest share of the responsibility. I am willing to take the whole or a part; but I am very anxious to know your opinion." Mr Frere knew that what the Spanish Government most deprecated, was a retreat of the British army upon Lisbon. It would sink the courage of the whole nation, and would lead them to believe, that England, after a fruitless effort, had relapsed into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore, a retreat were actually resolved upon as absolutely necessary, he thought the army should only fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the two Castiles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid) were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or provincial spirit, in all Spain: the people had been passive during the late events, and had seen their country occupied successively by the strongest party, and that it was even difficult to blame them; for, living in open villages, in vast plains, destitute both of arms and of horses, they had neither the means of defence nor escape. That such a country must of necessity belong to the party which was superior in cavalry: still, that even there a right feeling was not awanting; the towns were abandoned at the approach of the enemy; not a single magistrate had been brought over to take the oath of allegiance to the intruder, nor had the French been able to enlist a single soldier. The other provinces were possessed by the most ardent and determined spirit. There was no doubt of the people. The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to be very active, but there was hope that that inconvenience would be soon remedied. "They are resolute," added Mr Frere, "and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not, at least, set the example which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity." - Great advantages, the Ambassador thought, would result from advancing speedily to cover Madrid. The people of that town were very resolute and determined to defend it, in spite of its open situation; and nothing could be more unfavourable to the claims of the intruder, than to lay siege to the capital. The first object of the British, therefore, he thought, should be to march thither, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before farther reinforcements should arrive from France. There were reports that the resistance to the conscription had been more than usually obstinate; and a pastoral letter, written by the Bishop of Carcassonč, seemed to prove that these reports were not unfounded. Any advantages obtained over the enemy now, would be doubly important, since it would render a conscription for a third attempt upon Spain infinitely difficult, if not impracticable. But if, with their existing forces, they were allowed to retain all their present advantages, and to await the completion of the conscription, they would pour in troops, which would give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces, and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between the two countries; which could stand out longest against the waste of population. If, however, said Mr Frere, this view of the subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced would meet with the approbation of his Majesty's Government, he would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat from thence to Corunna (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country he has travelled over) would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon: and we ought, in that position, to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which extends immediately from that point throughout the whole of Leon and Old Castile. Before this letter arrived, however, General Moore's resolution had been taken, in consequence of the intelligence of Castano's defeat. Neither was it shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador; and he waited only for the junction of General Hope, to begin making his retreat upon Portugal.
The Central Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have come in person to Aranjuez, and conferred either with themselves, or the Military Council at Madrid; and he himself had formed the same wish, believing, that unless very prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat of the Spanish armies, and the ruin of their cause, were inevitable. But as this could not be, the Captain-general of Granada, with another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience, were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somo-Sierra; but Colonel Graham (now Lord Lyndoch) having just arrived with news that the pass had been won, Sir John considered them as weak old men, and as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted.
On the 5th December, a despatch arrived from the Duke of Castel Franco and Don Thomas Morla informing General Moore, that about 25,000 men, of the Central army, commanded by Castanos, were falling back on Madrid, - that 10,000, from the pass of Somo-Sierra, were also coming thither, and that these would be joined by 40,000 more. With that number of troops, the French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But the Junta, dreading an increase of the enemy's forces, hoped he would be able to unite with the Spanish army, or fall on the rear of the French; and they doubted not that the rapidity of his movements would be such as the interests of both countries required.
This letter was written on the 2d, at which time the men who signed it had determined to betray their country. But though thereby they might have wished to draw on the British army to its destruction, the proposal came not from them individually, but from the whole civil and military Junta, and was such as would have been given by every true Spaniard. While Sir John was pondering upon this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant, in the British service, arrived. Colonel Charmilly had been in Madrid on the night of the 1st, when the inhabitants were working in the trenches by torch-light, breaking up their streets, and barricading their houses. He had seen the Duke del Infantado, who told him that Madrid contained both provisions and ammunition; that more than 30,000 men had that day enlisted themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material consequence to the commonn cause, that the British Commander should make a diversion which would compel the French to divide their forces, and thus afford some succour to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eyewitness of the spirit of the people, and of the preparations which they were making for resistance. By another grandee, he was requested to tell Sir John Moore, that he must make use of this moment to save Spain, by making conditions with the Junta to form a better government; but most especially, he ought to require that the Spanish arnmy should be put under the orders of the British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had formerly been under those of Lord Peterborough. Colonel Charmilly, having passed through Talavera, had there found Mr Frere, who had just arrived, following the Central Junta, which was retiring to Badajoz from Aranjuez. He communicated to him what had passed between himself and the Duke del Infantado; and the Ambassador then requested him, as a Colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to delay his retreat, as a measure which would be most injurious to the cause of Spain, and equally so to that of England. But dreading, that, having once begun to retreat, Sir John might conceive himself engaged to persist in it, Mr Frere intrusted the Colonel with a second letter, to be delivered in case the General refused to alter his determination. The purport of this letter was to request, that the bearer might be examined before a Council of War. On reaching Salamanca, Colonel Charmilly, therefore, delivered Mr Frere's first letter; in which it was stated, that at Madrid the spirit and resolution of the people had so far exceeded all that Mr Frere had previously ventured to state, that he now could not forbear representing to General Moore, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the Spaniards by all the means which had been intrusted to him for that purpose. Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly's communication, General Moore gave him no reason to believe that the intention of retreating had been abandoned, but withdrew, to reflect upon what had passed, as his instructions from Lord Castlereagh had enjoined him to receive both the representations of the Spanish Government, and of the British Ambassador, with the utmost deference and attention - and they were unanimous in deprecating his retreat. Charmilly having been an eyewitness of the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report having come from various quarters, the General was almost persuaded that a great improvement in the public affairs had really taken place, and that it would be unadvisable in him to retreat at such a moment. Whereupon, he wrote that night to Sir David Baird, ordering him to suspend his retrograde movements till he should have further instructions, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, in case it should be requisite.
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