Section 4 (Start of the Retreat)

On the 26th December, Sir David Baird's division, which took the shorter line of road towards Astorga by the town of Valencia de Don Juan, effected their march without being molested. The sick and wounded, following in the same track, halted at the latter place to pass the night. Hardly had they been provided with the necessary food and laid to rest, before the bugles were sounded and they were again hurried into the waggons. The night was cold, misty, and extremely dark, and the Ezla was to be crossed some little distance from the town, near the lofty ruins of an old castle, which overhangs its banks. We were unprovided with pontoons. The ford is dangerous, because of the great rapidity of the stream occasioned by two narrow banks of shingles, which meeting, form an obtuse angle in the middle; and at this time the river was rising very fast from the melting of the snows on the mountains of Leon. A sergeant's guard had been left by Sir David on the opposite bank, to assist the waggons in coming over, and then skuttle two ferry-boats as soon as they had effected their passage; they kindled a fire with grass and rushes for the sake of its light; but the materials being wet, it was soon extinguished by the gusts of wind. A Spanish muleteer attempted to guide us over the ford; but his mule tripped in the midst of the stream, he was thrown off, and only saved by the activity of an English soldier, when in the act of sinking. Dangerous, however, as the ford was, the passage was accomplished without other loss than that of some baggage-waggons which broke down in the river.

Meantime, Sir John Moore, with the other division of the army, and followed by the rear-guard and cavalry, had reached Benevente; and there he found it necessary to issue a general order, unexampled for the severity in which it commented on the misconduct both of officers and men. But strong as its terms were, it produced no effect, and the havoc which had been committed by the division passing through Valderas was renewed at Benevente. The castle of Benevente is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry. Added to the grandeur of the Gothic, it has all the gorgeous richness of Moorish architecture. Open galleries, where Saracenic arches are supported by columns of porphyry and granite; cloisters with fountains playing in their centres; jasper columns and tesselated pavements; niches, alcoves, and seats in the walls, overarched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver. It belonged to the Duke of Ossuna, and the magnificence of ages far gone by was still displayed there. The extent of this glorious pile may be judged of from this circumstance, that two entire regiments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls. But alas, they proved the most destructive guests it had ever harboured, for their indignant feelings broke out once more in acts of wanton mischief; and the officers, who admired the beauties of this venerable edifice, attempted but in vain to save it from devastation. Every thing combustible was seized; fires were lighted against the fine walls; and pictures of unknown value were heaped together as mere fuel. Luckily, however, our soldiery were here afforded an opportunity of displaying their martial virtues. The rear of the army had but lately entered the town, when an alarm was given that the enemy had reached the opposite heights. In an instant, every man was at his post, and the dragoons poured out of the gates, - while in an opposite direction, the plain was covered with Spanish fugitives, and the streets were filled with the lamentations of females, calling upon the Virgin, and all the saints of the Catholic church, for succour. The French, perceiving in what spirit they were likely to be met, looked down on our troops from the heights, and retired. Evening coming on, and the enemy being so near, orders were given to destroy the bridge over the Ezla; which was effected towards day-break on the following morning, and it was imagined that their progress was suspended. Our troops again pursued their retreat; and the whole of the infantry and heavy artillery had set off, when intelligence arrived that the French cavalry were actually passing the Ezla, having discovered a ford about three hundred yards below the bridge. Lord Paget and General Stewart were still in the town. The night-picquets, under Lieutenant-Colonel Otway and Major Bagwell, were sent down; the cavalry were ordered to repair to their alarm-posts, and many volunteers came forward. Lord Paget hastened to the spot. He found four squadrons of Imperial Guards already formed, and skirmishing with the picquets; and more cavalry in the act of coming over the river. The 10th Hussars were sent for. As soon as they arrived, General Stewart placed himself at the head of the picquets, and charged the enemy, who immediately gave way, and repassed the ford with still greater rapidity than they had crossed it. However, they again formed on the opposite bank, and were threatening a second attack, when three pieces of horse-artillery, which now came up, were stationed near the broken bridge, and did considerable execution. About seventy prisoners were taken, and among them General Lefebvre Desnouettes, Commander of the Imperial Guard of cavalry, was taken by a private hussar of the 10th, named Grisdale. The enemy's loss could not be ascertained; but it was. variously guessed at, as being from 60 to 200. Our own was about 50 in killed and wounded. It was said that Napoleon was observing this action from the heights.

This fresh proof of British courage served evidently to damp the spirits of the French; and they continued their pursuit of us at so respectful a distance, that the rear of our troops reached Beneza that night quite unmolested. Next day, the 30th December, our Commander-in-chief reached Astorga. This was our rallying point, and here we found about 5000 men of Romana's army. That army was literally, as Colonel Symes had written to Sir John Moore, half-naked and half-starved. A malignant typhus fever was raging amongst them, and sixty or seventy were sent daily to the hospitals. Still about 5000 were fit for service, and Romana himself reached Astorga that day. The first intimation that the French were advancing to throw themselves between Portugal and the British army, had been received from that General; but it was his opinion that such information ought not to have produced any change in our Commander-in-chief's plans. The intended attack, he thought, ought still to have been made. Soult might have been beaten first, and plenty of time left us to have fallen afterwards upon the corps which was coming to his assistance; and by the success which prompt and vigorous measures would have insured, the united British and Spanish forces would thus have become masters of Leon and Castile. Romana now found that Sir John had no intention of making a stand at Astorga, part of the British army being already on the way towards Villa Franca del Bierzo, and one regiment of cavalry, all that was left on side of Baneza. The Marques went, therefore, to Sir John, and pointed out the expediency of checking the enemy where we now were, as it was a point from whence we might always have a secure retreat by the mountain-passes of Manzanal and Foncebadon - defiles so strong, that a small force might maintain them against any numbers. He mentioned to him also, that the park of artillery was at Ponferrada, where also hospitals had been established, and where there were magazines of corn; whilst, on the other hand, at Villa Franca there were more than 2000 sick, with a depôt of arms and hospital-stores, so that it was of the utmost importance to defend the entrance into the district called El Bierzo. But Sir John Moore replied, that he had determined upon retiring into Galicia, because his troops required rest. He requested that the high road of Manzanal might be left open to him, saying, that he should defend that and the principal entrance by Villa Franca; and that he, Romana, might take the Foncebadon pass, and enter by way of the Val de Orras and Puebla de Sanabria. And here we must record a proof of Spanish magnanimity, which was given by these half-armed, half-naked, and half-famished troops. A malignant fever was raging amongst them; and long fatigue, numerous privations, and the ravages of a mortal distemper made them appear rather like spectres issuing from an hospital than an army. Under such circumstances, it might have been presumed that they would anxiously have sought to secure their own retreat, under the protection of British bayonets, towards Corunna and Ferrol. But no; Romana and his forlorn band were too high-minded to attach themselves as a burden to us their allies, and they assented without hesitation to Sir John Moore's suggestion. Romana's only request was, that Sir John Moore would repress the horrible excesses of our troops, which even in an enemy's country would have been disgraceful; and our General must have been deeply mortified to feel, that even this request he could not enforce during a retreat so rapid as he intended that this should soon become.

Our troops had been assured at Benevente, that we were not falling back upon Corunna, but that we were only retiring towards a more favourable position. But our soldiers, judging from all they had already seen, were incredulous on this point; and when our Commander reached Astorga, and issued his orders, it was but too manifest that we were not only retreating, but actually flying before the enemy. Ammunition-waggons were here burnt, and an entire depôt of intrenching tools abandoned, so that the army was thus deprived of a most valuable means of resisting the progress of the French. The position at Villa Franca, which our Commander had formerly mentioned in his despatches, was no longer thought of. Two brigades, under General Crawford were detached, by way of Orensè, to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be sent for us, supposing that it was the best point of embarkation. This detachment went in advance of Romana, in that very line which he expected was to have been left open for him; and when he and his wretched men, after halting only one night, took their route towards Orensè, they found the country already stripped of the means of that subsistence upon which they had reckoned. General Fraser and his division were directly pushed on, with orders to proceed to Lugo. Sir John Hope and General Baird followed, and their instructions were to make forced marches to the coast. "We must all make forced marches," said General Moore in one of his despatches to Lord Castlereagh, "from the scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us." Hence it appears, that Sir John was as ignorant of the nature of the country through which he was passing, as he had formerly been on his setting out through Portugal; and that, too, notwithstanding the able Memoir which had been sent to him by Lord William. Bentinck, written by the Marquis Romana.* Westward of Astorga, two great ranges of mountains trend from north to south. Puerta del Rabanal, Cruz de Ferro, and Foncebadon, are those of the eastern branch; those of the western are the Puerto del Cebrero, Puerto del Courel, and Puerto del Aguiar; these meet on the south with the Sierra de Sanabria, Sierra de Cabrera, and the Montes Aquilianos. The tract enclosed by these lofty mountains is called El Bierzo:- from summit to summit it is about sixteen leagues from north to south, and about fourteen from east to west. The whole waters of this vast amphitheatre have but one opening; they are collected into the river Sil, and pass through a narrow gorge into the Val de Orras in Galicia. The centre is a plain of about four leagues square. Europe, in its whole extent, does not produce a more lovely tract of country, - and most assuredly there is not anywhere a more defensible spot. The main road, which is excellent, is that of Manzanal; that of Foncebadon also leads into the Bierzo; there is no third ingress; and from Villa Franca onwards to Corunna, the only way is that of the Puerto Cebrero. Both the former passages lead along defiles, where (as Romana had written three months before this retreat) a thousand men might stop the march of twenty times their own number; and, beyond Villa Franca, there is no lateral road. Sir David Baird's army had marched along this road; and they supposed, very naturally, that it never could be intended to retreat beyond that point. But Sir John could perceive no security till he should reach the coast, - there his hope was either to find his transports ready, or to occupy some defensible position till they should arrive. And once upon the sea-shore, it was his determination not to be molested by any thing like an equal force. It is only while retreating, he said, that we are vulnerable. His sole object had now become, no [sic] withdraw the army - to effect which, he had already destroyed great part of the ammunition and military stores, and now left behind many of our sick soldiers.

Heavy clouds covered the mountain tops, and the roads were knee-deep with snow. Provisions in a country where the natives are so poor, that they can rarely afford to lay up any store, can never be abundant; and whatever there might have been once, these had been already exhausted by the repeated marchings and countermarchings, both of Sir David Baird's troops and of the Spaniards. Much waste, too, was necessarily incurred by the disorderly manner in which such food had been issued out; and this magnified the dearth. Our men, half-famished, half-frozen, desperate, and execrating the orders of their General, were altogether furious, and no longer under any sort of control. They forced their way into the houses where their rations should have been doled out, seizing upon them by main force, spilling the wine and spirits, and destroying more than they carried away. Nor was this all - plundering could not be prevented. On leaving the villages, they set them on fire, often through carelessness, or when mad with liquor; and the peasantry, in revenge, rushed upon the more intoxicated with their knives, and made them atone in blood for their intemperance.


* The following is a translation of this important document. It had been sent to Lord William Bentinck by Lord Castlereagh, with instructions to forward it to General Moore.

"DOCUMENT BY THE MARQUIS DE LA ROMANA.

"Galicia and the Asturias, provinces in the north of Spain, are separated from the others contiguous to them, by chains of mountains of such a nature, as to render them almost inapproachable. The entrance into the first is defended by a double range of Cordilleras, separated from each other about seven leagues by a small district called El Bierzo, situated upon the confines of Old Castile. The first of these Cordilleras is called Fuente Cevadon, and terminates at a small distance from Astorga, the first city towards Castile. The second commences from Villa-Franca del Bierzo, and between these Cordilleras the country is sufficiently level; but these plains are so closely encircled, that an army would find itself altogether shut up, having no other outlet, except the great highway, which leads from Castile into Galicia, and which is so perfectly commanded by the mountains on the right and left, that a corps of a thousand men might arrest the progress of an army of 20,000. Hence it follows, that if the English Auxiliary Army should penetrate thence into the plains of Castile, it would be master of its movements, without any risk of having its retreat cut off; as that would be always assured by means of the great road which passes from Castile through Galicia, down to the seaport of Corunna. This circumstance, joined to the facility of entering into that harbour with every sort of wind, and in all seasons, and its proximity to the shores of England, combine imperiously in giving to this point, above all others, a most decided preference in making it the general depôt for the English Auxiliary Army. With regard to the Asturias, the French could not enter the defiles of that province, without exposing themselves to be completely destroyed, were it only by the armed Peasantry. In every event, the English army, flanked by the two Spanish armies, one of which would act in Biscay and the north of Old Castile, while the other should have its Position in the Rioja; the English army, I repeat, might deploy into line, and move on in front, without the least risk of being surrounded. Nay, there would remain a retreat for the English upon St Andero from Burgos, supposing that the general head-quarters were established in the latter city; as the road from Burgos to St Andero is only 30 leagues, and offers good defensive positions. So that a chain of magazines might likewise he established all along the great route from Burgos to Corunna, fixing the principal depôts and the hospitals at Leon and Astorga. From Burgos to Leon is a distance of 30 leagues, seven from Leon to Astorga, and 54 again from Astorga to Corunna."

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