THE year after the close of that campaign which terminated with the battle of Friedland and the peace of Tilsit, the 2d regiment of hussars, formerly named Chamboran, in which I had the honour to serve, received orders to leave Prussia, and march for Spain. I had thus an opportunity afforded me of comparing two very different kinds of military service - the war of regular troops, who seldom concern themselves about the matter of dispute, and the resistance of a nation, fighting for existence against a disciplined conquering force.
We were leaving the sandy plains of the north of Germany. We had been engaged with a people almost universally subject to military despotism. The several princes of the Germanic empire, for more than a century, had turned all their attention to the perfection of the military system, in order to establish their authority, and promote their personal ambition. But, in training their vassals to a punctual and minute obedience, they had enervated the national character - the only rampart against foreign invasion, the only invincible bulwark of a nation's strength.
When a province of Germany was conquered by the French, and could no longer obey its sovereign's commands, the lower classes, strangers to freedom of choice, dared not move a step without the impulse of their lords or their governments. These governments became, by conquest, subject to their conqueror's influence; and their lords, accustomed to witness the constant vexations which the people experienced from the soldiery, resigned themselves the more tamely to the evils which war introduces.
In Prussia, the clergy held little ascendency over the people. Among Protestants, the Reformation had destroyed that dominion which the priests still maintain in some Catholic countries, and above all in Spain. Men of letters, who might have influenced public opinion, and made their genius subservient to the prosperity of their country, were rarely called on to intermeddle with public affairs. The sole aim of their ambition was literary renown; and they did not apply themselves to those pursuits and studies which were adapted to the circumstances of the times. The real authority of many of the States in Germany was hinged upon their military systems; and their political existence necessarily depended on the energy or imbecility of their governments.
In the plains of Germany, the nature of the country did not afford such facilities of escape from the yoke of the conquerors, as in other countries of a more barren, marshy, or mountainous nature. Small bodies of troops were sufficient to hold a great extent of conquered country in subjection, and to ensure our armies of their necessary supplies. The citizens could have found no secure places of retreat, had they been disposed to any partial revolts; besides, the Germans being habituated to a quiet and uniform life, are only stimulated to desperate exertions by the complete derangement of their habits.
The war in Germany was wholly carried on between troops of the line, among whom there exists rather rivalry than hatred. From the inhabitants of the conquered Countries we had nothing to fear. The success of a campaign depended on the unity of military operations, the ability and perseverance of the chiefs, their sagacity to foresee and anticipate, and in bringing forward, opportunely and promptly, to decisive points of attack, overpowering masses of troops. We were not exposed to those petty skirmishes, which, in regular warfare, only increase particular suffering, without contributing to general advantage; and the capacity of generals was never defeated by individual interference, or popular spontaneous movements.
In Germany we had only to conquer governments and armies: in the Spanish Peninsula, where we were now carrying our arms, there no longer existed either the one or the other. The Emperor Napoleon had invaded Portugal and Spain - had put to flight or taken captive the sovereigns of these two countries - and had dispersed their military forces. We had not now to contend with regular troops, everywhere nearly alike, but with a people who, in their manners, their prejudices, and the very nature of their country, were isolated from every other nation on the Continent. The Spaniards had to oppose to us a resistance the determined, that they believed the French Government designed to make the Peninsula but a secondary state, subject unalterably to the dominion of France.
Spain, in point of knowledge, and skill in social arts, was more than a century in the rear of all other States on the Continent. Its remote and nearly insular situation, and the rigour of its ecclesiastical establishments, had deterred the Spaniards from interfering in those disputes and controversies of the sixteenth century, which had agitated and enlightened Europe. They concerned themselves as little with the philosophical spirit of the eighteenth, to which the French Revolution may in part be ascribed.
However, though the Spaniards were thus sunk in indolence, and though that confusion and corruption which inevitably follow a long despotism were manifest in their administration, still their national character remained unimpaired. Their government, arbitrary as it was, in no respect resembled the absolute military power of Germany; where the eternal prostration of each and all to one was so admirably calculated to paralyze the energies of individual character.
It is true, indeed, that Ferdinand the Catholic, Charles V. and Philip II., had usurped nearly all be privileges of the Grandees and Cortes, and prostrated the liberty of Spain. But, in spite of the despotism of the sovereigns their successors, imbecility of government could not wrest from the people a liberty of action, which often rose insubordination itself.
In the annals of German monarchies, we read only of princes and armies. In Spain, since the time that Ferdinand the Catholic reunited the different kingdoms into one government, there has scarcely a reign passed without the people proving their being and their power in proscribing terms to their masters, or deposing some of the ministers or favourites. When the inhabitants of Madrid rose in insurrection, to demand from Charles III., father of Charles IV., the dismissal of his minister Squilaci, the king himself was constrained to appear and appease the people, and to strengthen his influence with the company of a monk holding a crucifix in his hand. The court, which had fled to Aranjuez, then endeavoured to march the Walloon guards against Madrid; but the people, killing several, raised the universal shout....."Si entraran los Vallones, no reyneran los Borbones." - "If the Walloons enter, the Bourbons shall not reign." The guards did not enter. Squilaci was dismissed, and order was restored. In Berlin and Prussia, the inhabitants honoured the soldiers of their king in their military capacity, as the soldiers honoured their commanders. In Madrid, the sentinels on duty, in executing their sovereign's orders, gave way to a common citizen.
The revenues of the crown being very limited, few troops could be maintained. With the exception of some privileged companies, the regiments of the line were incomplete, ill paid, and ill disciplined. Ecclesiastics were the only powerful efficient militia of Spanish kings. They restrained and dispersed the riots of the populace by the artillery of words from their altars, and by the standards of pontifical ornaments and relics.
The lofty and sterile mountains which run throughout and around Spain, were inhabited by a warlike, indomitable people, always armed to carry on their contraband traffic, and trained to repulse the regular troops of their nation, often sent in pursuit of them.
The people of Spain were almost wholly governed by the clergy. Their priests were inimical to the French, not less from patriotism than from interest. They knew well that it was intended to deprive them of their privileges, and to spoil them of their patrimony and their patronage. Their opinion involved that of the community at large. Every Spaniard regarded the public grievance as his personal quarrel. In fine, we had about as many foes to fight, as the Peninsula could number inhabitants.
Other obstacles existed to deprive us of the same facilities of retaining our conquests and securing our communications and supplies, as we possessed in the north of Germany. The mildness of their climate throughout the year was such as to permit living in the open air, and of abandoning their houses, therefore, without any hardship or regret; their mountains afforded them inaccessible retreats; and the sea everywhere presented opportunities of escape. Besides, the numerous and terrible navy of England gave our enemy the means of increasing their strength, whether for transporting them speedily to our vulnerable points, or of giving wings to their flight, and supplying them with a refuge from the pursuit of our victorious troops.
When we broke up our cantonments in Prussia for the purpose of going to Spain, we believed we were marching on an easy expedition, which would be of short duration. Conquerors in Germany, we never once imagined that any thing could resist us. We never reflected on the unforeseen difficulties which the nature of the country so new to us, and the character of the inhabitants, might present.
Our soldiers never inquired whither they were going. If there were provisions to be had in the country they must visit, it was the only point of view in which they regarded the geography of the earth. Their world had but two divisions 葉he blessed zone where the vine grows, and the miserable region where it is unknown. Being told, at the commencement of each campaign, that they were called on to strike the last blow at the tottering power of the English, they confounded that power, under every form, with England itself. They judged of their distance from it, by the number of marches they had made. For years, from one end of the world to the other, they had been seeking this remote and visionary country, which still receded as they followed. "At length," said they, "if the desert divided us from it in Egypt, and the sea at Boulogne, we shall soon reach it by land in crossing Spain.
The Elbe and the Weser being passed, we reached the left bank of the Rhine and France. When we quitted Prussia, in September 1808, the likelihood of a war with Austria had been talked of for two months, and none of us doubted but our march was towards the Danube. Our troops bade farewell to Germany with heavy hearts, and almost with tears葉hat lovely land which they had conquered....that country of war, from whence they carried so many memorials of glory, and where, at the same time, they had often known that they had made themselves beloved!
We passed through France as if it had been a country lately conquered and subdued by our arms. The Emperor Napoleon had ordained that his soldiers should be everywhere well received and entertained. Deputations from his faithful cities came to compliment us at their gates. The officers and soldiers were conducted, on their arrival, to splendid feasts prepared for their reception; and on our departure the magistrates thanked us, over and above, that we had been pleased to spend, in one day, the special revenue of many weeks of their municipal funds.
The soldiers of the grand army did not lose the custom in France they had contracted in Germany, of sometimes abusing the citizens and peasants with whom they were quartered. The auxiliary troops, especially, would not be convinced that they ought not to conduct themselves in Prance as in an enemy's country. They told us it must be the common practice, since the French troops behaved not otherwise among them in Germany and Poland. The inhabitants of the towns and districts where we passed, bore it all with patience, and calmly waited till the armed torrent flowed past.
Our troops were composed (besides French) of Germans, Italians, Poles, Swiss, Dutch, and even Irish and Mamelukes. These strangers were all clad in the costume of their own countries; they retained their own customs, and spoke their native languages. But notwithstanding the difference of manners which raises barriers between nations, they were easily brought, by military discipline, less than one powerful hand, into one united whole. All these men wore the same cockade, and had but one cry to fight and rally.
We crossed the Seine at Paris, the Loire at Saumur, the Garonne at Bourdeaux. We enjoyed there some days rest, for the first time since we left Prussia, whilst the remainder of the army were reaching the opposite bank of the river. We travelled next through the uncultivated heaths which lie between Bourdeaux and Bayonne. The sandy soil of these solitary plains, like the moors of Prussia and Poland, did not resound under the tread of our horses, or echo back their regular and accelerated pace, to reanimate their ardour. Vast forests of cork-tree and pine bounded the horizon in the distance; and shepherds, clad in the black skins of their sheep, were observed at wide intervals, mounted on stilts, six or seven feet in height, and supported by long poles. They continued stedfast in one place, without ever losing sight of their flocks, which fed on the moors around them. When the Emperor Napoleon crossed these immense heaths, the poverty of the country could not afford the etiquette of a horse-guard of honour. His escort was a detachment of these shepherds, who marched foot for foot on their long stilts, with our horses trotting in the sand.
A few leagues beyond Bayonne we arrived at the Bidassoa, a stream which bounds France among the Pyrenees. The moment we set foot on the Spanish territory, an evident difference was perceived in the face of the country, and the manners of the inhabitants. The narrow winding streets of their towns葉heir grated windows葉heir doors perpetually shut葉he stern and reserved air of all classes of inhabitants葉heir suspicion of us so very generally manifested; all tended to increase that unnatural sadness which possessed every one of us on our entrance into Spain.
We saw the Emperor Napoleon pass on horseback, before he arrived at Vittoria. He was remarkable, from the simplicity of his green uniform, among the splendid dresses of his generals around him. He waved his hand particularly to each officer as he passed, as if he would have said - "I depend on you." French and Spaniards flocked around him on his way. The former beheld in him alone the fortune of the entire army. The Spaniards were intent to gather, from his aspect and carriage, what fate was awaiting their unhappy country.
About the end of October 1808, the Grand army of Germany formed a junction with the French army under the command of King Joseph in Spain. There, with surprise, we first learned from our brethren in arms, part of the events of the Peninsular war, and the details * of those unhappy actions which had compelled Generals Dupont and Junot to capitulate in Andalusia and Portugal, Marshal Moncey to raise the siege of Valencia, and the whole army, in a word, to retire and concentrate itself on the left bank of the Ebro.
* King Joseph was at Vittoria with the general staff of his army and his guards. Marshal Moncey, with his corps of observation, was at Tafalla, watching the Spanish army of General Palafox, stationed at Sanguessa, on the frontiers of Navarre and Arragon. The troops under the command of Marshal Ney kept possession of Logrono and Guardia. The Spanish armies, commanded by Generals Castanos and Palafox, about 40,000 strong, when united, lay before them in the environs of Tudela on the Ebro. Marshal Bessieres was at Miranda on the Ebro, in a position covered by the numerous and well-mounted cavalry of General Lassalle. In falling back, he had left a garrison in the citadel of Pancorvo. Marshal Lefevre occupied Durango. The troops under Marshal Bessieres and Lefevre faced the centre and the left of the Spanish forces under Generals Belvidere and Blake. The central Spanish army, stationed at Burgos, might not amount to more than 12,000, or 14,000 men. It was to be reinforced by 26,000 English, which were on their march from Portugal and Corunna, under Generals Moore and Sir D. Baird. This army was designed to sustain that of the left, which General Blake commanded in Biscay, and to keep the communication open with the Spanish armies in Arragon and Navarre.
The army of General Blake, although 37,000 strong, had few cavalry, and therefore dared not descend into the flat country around Miranda and Vittoria. It had abandoned its position between Ona Frias and Erron, to occupy Bilbao; and had penetrated through the mountains which separate Biscay from the province of Alva, towards Durango, as far as Zamora and Archandiano, in order to raise the country, cut off the communications, and attack the right of the army of King Joseph. The Spanish armies of Navarre and Arragon were to perform the same movement against the centre and left wing of the French, for the purpose of compelling them to fall back by way of Tolosa, or of forcing them into the defiles of Navarre towards Pampeluna. Such were the designs of the Spaniards, and the situation of affairs, when Napoleon took the command of the armies in that country.
The army of General Blake was attacked on the 31st of October, near Durango, by the corps of Marshal Lefevre. He repulsed it, and entered Bilbao the day following. Marshal Victor s corps, which was to form, along with that of Lefevre, the right of our army, moved on the 6th of November from Vittoria towards Ordunna.
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