Neale's "Spanish Campaign of 1808"

SIR JOHN MOORE S LAST DESPATCH.*

(Referred to at page 198.)

Corunna, 13th January 1809.

MY LORD,

Situated as the army is at present, it is impossible for me to detail to your Lordship the events which have taken place, since I had the honour to address you from Astorga on the 31st December. I have therefore determined to send to England Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, as the officer best qualified to give you every information you can want, both with respect to our actual situation, and the events which have led to it. From his connexion with your Lordship, and with his Majesty's Ministers, whatever he relates is most likely to be believed. He is a man in whose honour I have the most perfect reliance; he is incapable of stating any thing but the truth, and it is the truth which at all times I wish to convey to your Lordship, and to the King's government.

Your Lordship knows, that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and * *
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I was satisfied that no efforts would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which they were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that, had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power, nor the inclination, to make any efforts for themselves.

It was for this reason that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion, it succeeded: I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made * * *
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to favour its retreat.
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* * The people of the Galicias, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through their mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our sick have been left behind; when our horses and mules failed, which on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed or abandoned.

I am sorry to say that the army, whose conduct I had such reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it began to retreat.
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* * I can say nothing in its favour, but that, when there was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty. In front of Villafranca, the French came up with the reserve, with which I was covering the retreat of the army. They attacked it at Calcabalos. I retired, covered by the 95th regiment, and marched that night to Herrerias, and thence to Nogales and Lugo; where I had ordered the different divisions which preceded to halt and collect. At Lugo the French again came up with me: they attacked our advanced posts on the 6th and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts, with little loss on our side.

I heard from the prisoners taken, that three divisions of the French army, commanded by Marshal Soult, were come up. I therefore expected to be attacked on the morning of the 8th. It was my wish to come to that issue; I had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and it was only by crippling the enemy that we could hope either to retreat or to embark unmolested. I made every preparation to receive the attack; and drew out the army in the morning to offer battle. This was not Marshal Soult's object: he either did not think himself sufficiently strong, or he wished to play a surer game, by attacking us on our march, or during our embarkation. The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The want of provisions would not enable me to wait longer. I marched that night; and, in two forced marches, bivouacking for six or eight hours in the rain, I reached Betanzos on the 10th instant.* *
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At Lugo I was sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, which was at too great a distance, and offered no advantages to embark in the face of an enemy. My intention then was to have retreated to the peninsula of Betanzos, where I hoped to find a position to cover the embarkation of the army in Ares or Rodes Bays; but having sent an officer to reconnoitre it, by his report I was determined to prefer this place. I gave notice to the Admiral of my intention, and begged that the transports might be brought to Corunna. Had I found them here on my arrival, on the 11th instant, the embarkation would easily have been effected, for I had gained several marches on the French. They have now come up with us; the transports are not arrived. My position in front of this place is a very bad one; and this place, if I am forced to retire into it, is commanded within musket shot; and the harbour will be so commanded by cannon on the coast, that no ship will be able to lay in it. In short, my Lord, General, Stewart will inform you how critical our situation is. It has been recommended to me, to make a proposal to the enemy, to induce him to allow us to embark quietly; in which case, he gets us out of the country soon, and this place, with its stores &c. complete; that, otherwise, we have it in our power to make a long defence, which must ensure the destruction of the town. I am averse to make any such proposal; and am exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect: but, whatever I resolve on this head, I hope your Lordship will rest assured, that I shall accept no terms that are in the least dishonourable to the army, or to the country. I find I have been led into greater length and more detail than I thought I should have had time for: I have written under interruptions, and with my mind much occupied with other matter. My letter, written so carelessly, can only be considered as private: when I have more leisure I shall write more correctly. In the meantime, I rely on General Stewart for giving your Lordship the information and detail which I have omitted. I should regret his absence, for his services have been very distinguished; but the state of his eyes makes it impossible for him to serve, and this country is not one in which cavalry can be of much use.

If I succeed in embarking the army, I shall send it to England - it is quite unfit for further service, until it. has been refitted, which can best be done there. * * *
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I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN MOORE.

Right Hon. Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

* In this despatch there are several omissions, owing to the following circumstance: In the month of March 1809, the Secretary of State for the War department sent for Mr James Moore, and informed him, that it was the intention of Administration to accede to laying this letter before Parliament, which, however, being a private letter, and not written in the usual manner of official despatches, it was thought proper to omit some passages which his Lordship would point out. Mr Moore replied, that he could not presume to object to any omissions which did not affect his brother s reputation. After this conversation, it was judged improper to fill up the blanks. One passage at the beginning, however, it was considered, might be restored, where mention is made of the Honourable Brigadier-General Stewart, brother to Lord Castlereagh.

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